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Differential privacy has emerged as a promising probabilistic formulation of privacy, generating intense interest
within academia and industry. We present a push-button, automated technique for verifying ε-differential
privacy of sophisticated randomized algorithms. We make several conceptual, algorithmic, and practical
contributions: (i) Inspired by the recent advances on approximate couplings and randomness alignment, we
present a new proof technique called coupling strategies, which casts differential privacy proofs as a winning
strategy in a game where we have finite privacy resources to expend. (ii) To discover a winning strategy, we
present a constraint-based formulation of the problem as a set of Horn modulo couplings (hmc) constraints, a
novel combination of first-order Horn clauses and probabilistic constraints. (iii) We present a technique for
solving hmc constraints by transforming probabilistic constraints into logical constraints with uninterpreted
functions. (iv) Finally, we implement our technique in the FairSquare verifier and provide the first automated
privacy proofs for a number of challenging algorithms from the differential privacy literature, including Report
Noisy Max, the Exponential Mechanism, and the Sparse Vector Mechanism.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As more and more personal information is aggregated into massive databases, a central question is
how to safely use this data while protecting privacy. Differential privacy [Dwork et al. 2006] has
recently emerged as one of the most promising formalizations of privacy. Informally, a randomized
program is differentially private if on any two input databases differing in a single person’s private
data, the program’s output distributions are almost the same; intuitively, a private program shouldn’t
depend (or reveal) too much on any single individual’s record. Differential privacy models privacy
quantitatively, by bounding how much the output distribution can change.
Besides generating intense interest in fields like machine learning, theoretical computer science,
and security, differential privacy has proven to be a surprisingly fruitful target for formal verification.
By now, several verification techniques can automatically prove privacy given a lightly annotated
program; examples include linear type systems [Gaboardi et al. 2013; Reed and Pierce 2010] and
various flavors of dependent types [Barthe et al. 2015; Zhang and Kifer 2017]. For verification,
the key feature of differential privacy is composition: private computations can be combined into
more complex algorithms while automatically satisfying a similar differential privacy guarantee.
Composition properties make it easy to design new private algorithms, and also make privacy
feasible to verify.
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While composition is a powerful tool for proving privacy, it often gives an overly conservative
estimate of the privacy level for more sophisticated algorithms. Verification—in particular, auto-
mated verification—has been far more challenging for these examples. However, these algorithms
are highly important to verify since their proofs are quite subtle. One example, the Sparse Vector
mechanism [Dwork et al. 2009], has been proposed in slightly different forms at least six separate
times throughout the literature. While there were proofs of privacy for each variant, researchers
later discovered that only two of the proofs were correct [Lyu et al. 2017]. Another example, the
Report Noisy Max mechanism [Dwork and Roth 2014], has also suffered from flawed privacy proofs
in the past.
1.1 State-of-the-art in Differential Privacy Verification
Recently, researchers have developed techniques to verify private algorithms beyond composition:
approximate couplings [Barthe et al. 2016b] and randomness alignment [Zhang and Kifer 2017].
Approximate Couplings. Approximate couplings are a generalization of couplings [Lindvall
2002] from probability theory. Informally, a coupling models two distributions with a single
correlated distribution, while an approximate coupling approximately models the two given
distributions. Given two output distributions of a program, the existence of a coupling with
certain properties can imply target properties about the two output distributions, and about the
program itself.
Approximate couplings are a rich abstraction for reasoning about differential privacy, supporting
clean, compositional proofs for many examples beyond the reach of the standard composition
theorems for differential privacy. Barthe et al. [2016b] first explored approximate couplings for
proving differential privacy, building approximate couplings in a relational program logic apRHL
where the rule for the random sampling command selects an approximate coupling. While this
approach is quite expressive, there are two major drawbacks: (i) Constructing proofs requires
significant manual effort—existing proofs are formalized in an interactive proof assistant—and
selecting the correct couplings requires considerable ingenuity. (ii) Like Hoare logic, apRHL does
not immediately lend itself to a systematic algorithmic technique for finding invariants, making
it a challenging target for automation.
Randomness Alignment. In an independent line of work, Zhang and Kifer [2017] used a
technique called randomness alignment to prove differential privacy. Informally, a randomness
alignment for two distributions is an injection pairing the samples in the first distribution with
samples in the second distribution, such that paired samples have approximately the same
probability. Zhang and Kifer [2017] implemented their approach in a semi-automated system
called LightDP, combining a dependent type system, a custom type-inference algorithm to
search for the desired randomness alignments, and a product program construction. Notably,
LightDP can analyze standard examples as well as more advanced examples like the Sparse
Vector mechanism. While LightDP is an impressive achievement, it, too has a few shortcomings:
(i) While randomness alignments can be inferred by LightDP’s sophisticated type inference
algorithm, the full analysis depends on a product program construction with manually-provided
loop invariants. (ii) Certain examples provable by approximate couplings seem to lie beyond the
reach of LightDP. (iii) Finally, the analysis in LightDP is technically complex, involving three
kinds of program analysis.
While the approaches seem broadly similar, their precise relation remains unclear. Proofs using
randomness alignment are often simpler—critical for automation—while approximate couplings
seem to be a more expressive proof technique.
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Fig. 1. Overview of our coupling strategy synthesis methodology
1.2 Our Approach: Automated Synthesis of Coupling Proofs
We aim to blend the best features of both approaches—expressivity and automation—enabling fully
automatic construction of coupling proofs. To do so, we (i) present a novel formulation of proofs of
differential privacy via couplings, (ii) present a constraint-based technique for discovering coupling
proofs, and (iii) discuss how to solve these constraints using techniques from automated program
synthesis and verification. We describe the key components and novelties of our approach below,
and illustrate the overall process in Fig. 1.
Proofs via Coupling Strategies. The most challenging part of a coupling proof is selecting an
appropriate coupling for each sampling instruction. Our first insight is that we can formalize the
proof technique as discovering a coupling strategy, which chooses a coupling for each part of the
program while ensuring that the couplings can be composed together. A winning coupling strategy
proves that the program is differentially private.
To show soundness, we propose a novel, fine-grained version of approximate couplings—variable
approximate couplings—where the privacy level can vary depending on the pair of states. We
show that a winning coupling strategy encodes a variable approximate coupling of the two output
distributions, establishing differential privacy for the program. To encode more complex proofs, we
give new constructions of variable approximate couplings inspired by the randomness alignments
of Zhang and Kifer [2017].
Horn Modulo Couplings. To automatically synthesize coupling strategies, we describe winning
coupling strategies as a set of constraints. Constraint-based techniques are a well-studied tool for
synthesizing loop invariants, rely-guarantee proofs, ranking functions, etc. For instance, constrained
Horn clauses are routinely used as a first-order-logic representation of proof rules [Bjørner et al.
2015; Grebenshchikov et al. 2012b]. The constraint-based style of verification cleanly decouples the
theoretical task of devising the proof rules from the algorithmic task of solving the constraints.
However, existing constraint systems are largely geared towards deterministic programs—it is
not clear how to encode randomized algorithms and the differential privacy property. We present
a novel system of constraints called Horn modulo couplings (hmc), extending Horn clauses with
probabilistic coupling constraints that use first-order relations to encode approximate couplings.
hmc constraints can describe winning coupling strategies.
Solving HornModulo Couplings Constraints. Solving hmc constraints is quite challenging, as
they combine logical and probabilistic constraints. To simplify the task, we transform probabilistic
coupling constraints into logical constraints with unknown expressions. The key idea is that we
can restrict coupling strategies to use known approximate couplings from the privacy literature,
augmented with a few new constructions we propose in this work.
Our transformation yields a constraint of the form ∃f . ∀x .ϕ, read as: there exists a strategy f
such that for all inputs x , the program is differentially private. We employ established techniques
from synthesis and program verification to solve these simplified constraints. Specifically, we use
counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (cegis) [Solar-Lezama et al. 2006] to discover a strategy
f , and predicate abstraction [Graf and Saïdi 1997] to prove that f is a winning strategy.
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Implementation and Evaluation. We have implemented our technique in the FairSquare prob-
abilistic verification infrastructure [Albarghouthi et al. 2017] and used it to automatically prove
ε-differential privacy of a number of algorithms from the literature that have so far eluded automated
verification. For example, we give the first fully automated proofs of Report Noisy Max [Dwork
and Roth 2014], the discrete exponential mechanism [McSherry and Talwar 2007], and the Sparse
Vector mechanism [Lyu et al. 2017].
1.3 Outline and Contributions
After illustrating our technique on a motivating example (§ 2), we present our main contributions.
• We introduce coupling strategies as a way of representing coupling proofs of ε-differential
privacy (§ 4). To prove soundness, we develop a novel generalization of approximate couplings
to support more precise reasoning about the privacy level (§ 3).
• We introduce Horn modulo couplings, which enrich first-order Horn clauses with probabilistic
coupling constraints. We show how to reduce the problem of proving differential privacy to
solving Horn modulo couplings constraints (§ 5).
• We show how to automatically solve Horn modulo couplings constraints by transforming
probabilistic coupling constraints into logical constraints with unknown expressions (§ 6).
• We use automated program synthesis and verification techniques to implement our system,
and demonstrate its ability to efficiently and automatically prove privacy of a number of
differentially private algorithms from the literature (§ 7).
Our approach marries ideas from probabilistic relational logics and type systems with constraint-
based verification and synthesis; we compare with other verification techniques (§ 8).
2 MOTIVATION AND ILLUSTRATION
1
2
6
3
4
5
function rnm(q)
i, best, r  0
while i < |q|
d ⇠ Lap ✏
2
(q[i])
if d > best _ i = 0
r, best i, d
i i+ 1
return r7
−4 −2 0 2 4
µ0 µ1
Fig. 2. (top) Report Noisy Max.
(bot) Laplace distrs.
In this section, we demonstrate our verification technique on a
concrete example. Our running example is an algorithm from the
differential privacy literature called Report Noisy Max [Dwork
and Roth 2014], which finds the query with the highest value in a
list of counting queries. For instance, given a database of medical
histories, each query in the list could count the occurrences of a
certain medical condition. Then, Report Noisy Max would reveal
the condition with approximately the most occurrences, adding
random noise to protect the privacy of patients.
We implement this algorithm in Fig. 2 (top) as the program rnm.
Given an array q of numeric queries of size |q |, rnm evaluates
each query, adds noise to the answer, and reports the index of
the query with the largest noisy answer. To achieve ε-differential
privacy (ε-dp, for short), Laplacian noise is added to the result
of each query in the first statement of the while loop. (Fig. 2
(bottom) shows two Laplace distributions.) While the code is
simple, proving ε-dp is anything but—the only existing formal
proof uses the probabilistic relational program logic apRHL and was carried out in an interactive
proof assistant [Barthe et al. 2016b].
2.1 Proof by approximate coupling, intuitively
Differential privacy is a relational property of programs (also known as a hyperproperty) that
compares the output distributions on two different inputs, modeling two hypothetical versions of
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the private data that should be considered indistinguishable. In the case of rnm, the private data
is simply the list of query answers q[i]; we will assume that two input states (s1, s2) are similar
(also called adjacent) when each query answer differs by at most 1 in the two inputs; formally,
∀j ∈ [0,n). |q1[j] −q2[j]| ⩽ 1, where q1,q2 are copies of q in the adjacent states, and |q1 | = |q2 | = n.
Adding to the verification challenge, differential privacy is also a quantitative property, often
parameterized by a number ε . To prove ε-differential privacy, we must show that the probability of
any final output is approximately the same in two executions of the program from any two adjacent
inputs. The degree of similarity—and the strength of the privacy guarantee—is governed by ε :
smaller values of ε guarantee more similar probabilities, and yields stronger privacy guarantees.
Formally, rnm is ε-dp if
for every pair of adjacent inputs q1 and q2, every possible output j, and every ε > 0,
Pr[rnm(q1) = j] ⩽ exp(ε) · Pr[rnm(q2) = j]
While it could theoretically be possible to analyze the two executions separately and then verify
the inequality, this approach is highly complex. Instead, let us imagine that we step through the
two executions side-by-side while tracking the two states. Initially, we have the input states (s1, s2).
A deterministic instruction simply updates both states, say to (s ′1, s ′2).
Random sampling instructions x ∼ µ are more challenging to handle. Since we are considering
two sampling instructions, in principle we need to consider all possible pairs of samples in the
two programs. However, since we eventually want to show that the probability of some output
in the first run is close to the probability of that same output in the second run, we can imagine
pairing each result from the first sampling instruction with a corresponding result from the second
sampling instruction, with approximately the same probabilities. This pairing yields a set of paired
states; intuitively, one for each possible sample. By flowing this set forward through the program—
applying deterministic instructions, selecting how to match samples for sampling instructions, and
so on—we end up pairing every possible output state in the first execution with a corresponding
output state in the second execution with approximately the same probability.
Proving differential privacy, then, boils down to cleverly finding a pairing for each sampling
instruction in order to ensure that all paired output states are related in some particular way. For
instance, if whenever the first output state has return value 5 its matching state also has return
value 5, then the probability of returning 5 is roughly the same in both distributions.
Approximate Couplings. This idea for proving differential privacy can be formalized as a proof
by approximate coupling, inspired by the proof by coupling technique from probability theory (see,
e.g., Lindvall [2002]). An approximate coupling for two probability distributions µ1, µ2 is a relation
Λ ⊆ S × S ×R attaching a non-negative real number c to every pair of linked (or coupled) states
(s1, s2). The parameter c bounds how far apart the probability of s1 in µ1 is from the probability of s2
in µ2: when c = 0 the two probabilities must be equal, while a larger c allows greater differences in
probabilities. This parameter may grow as our analysis progresses through the program, selecting
approximate couplings for the sampling instructions as we go. If we have two states (s1, s2) that have
probabilities that are bounded by c and we then pair the results from the next sampling instruction
(v1,v2) with probabilities bounded by c ′, the resulting paired states will have probabilities bounded
by c + c ′. We can intuitively think of c ′ as a cost that we need to pay in order to pair up the samples
(v1,v2) from two sampling instructions.
To make this discussion more concrete, suppose we sample from the two Laplace distributions
in Fig. 2 (bottom) in the two runs. This figure depicts the probability density functions (pdf) of
two different Laplace distributions over the integers Z:1 µ0 (red; solid) is centered at 0 and µ1 (blue;
1For visualization, we use the continuous Laplace distribution; formally, we assume the discrete Laplace distribution.
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dashed) is centered at 1. Then, the relation
Λ= = {(x ,x , c) | x ∈ Z}
is a possible approximate coupling for the two distributions, denoted µ0 ↭Λ= µ1, where the cost c
depends on the width of the Laplace distributions. The coupling Λ= pairs every sample x ∈ Z from
µ0 with the same sample x from µ1. These samples have different probabilities—since µ0 and µ1 are
not equal—so the coupling records that the two probabilities are within an exp(c) multiple of one
another.2
In general, two distributions have multiple possible approximate couplings. Another valid cou-
pling for µ0 and µ1 is
Λ+1 = {(x ,x + 1, 0) | x ∈ Z}.
This coupling pairs each sample x from µ0 with the sample x + 1 from µ1. Since µ1 is just µ0 shifted
by 1, we know that the probabilities of sampling x from µ0 and x + 1 from µ1 are in fact equal.
Hence, each pair has cost 0 and we incur no cost from selecting this coupling.
Concrete Example. Let us consider the concrete case of rnm with adjacent inputs q1 = [0, 1] and
q2 = [1, 0], and focus on one possible return value j = 0. To prove the probability bound for output
j = 0, we need to choose couplings for the sampling instructions such that every pair of linked
output states has cost c ⩽ ε , and if the first output is 0, then so is the second output. In other words,
the coupled outputs should satisfy the relation r1 = 0 =⇒ r2 = 0.
In the first iteration, our analysis arrives at the sampling instruction d ∼ Lapε/2(q[0]), represent-
ing a sample from the Laplace distribution with mean q[0] and scale 2/ε . Since q1[0] and q2[0] are 1
apart, we can couple the values of d1 and d2 with the first coupling
Λ= = {(x ,x , ε/2) | x ∈ Z}.
By paying a cost ε/2, we can assume that d1 = d2; effectively, applying the coupling Λ= as
replaces the probabilistic assignments into a single assignment, where the two processes non-
deterministically choose a coupled pair of values from Λ=. Therefore, the processes enter the same
branch of the conditional and always set r to the same value—in particular, if r1 = 0, then r2 = 0,
as desired. Similarly, in the second iteration, we can select the same coupling Λ= and pay ε/2.
This brings our total cost to ε/2 + ε/2 = ε and ensures that both processes return the same value
r1 = r2—in particular, if r1 = 0 then r2 = 0, again establishing the requirement for ε-dp for output
j = 0.
This assignment of a coupling for each iteration is an example of a coupling strategy: namely,
our simple strategy selects Λ= in every iteration. This strategy also applies for more general inputs,
but possibly with a different total cost. For instance if we consider larger inputs, e.g., with |q | = 3,
we will have to pay ε/2 in three iterations, and therefore we cannot conclude ε-dp. Indeed, this
strategy only establishes |q |ε2 -differential privacy in general, as we pay ε/2 in each of the |q | loop
iterations. Since larger parameters correspond to looser differential privacy guarantees, this is a
weaker property. However, Report Noisy Max is in fact ε-dp for arrays of any length. To prove this
stronger guarantee, we need a more sophisticated coupling strategy.
We call coupling strategies that establish ε-dp winning couplings strategies. Intuitively, the verifier
plays a game against the two processes: The processes play by making non-deterministic choices,
while the verifier plays by selecting and paying for approximate couplings of sampling instructions,
aiming to stay under a “budget” ε .
2When c is small, this is roughly a (1 + c) factor.
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2.2 Synthesizing winning coupling strategies
Let us consider a different coupling strategy for rnm. Informally, we will focus on one possible
output j at a time, and we will only pay non-zero cost in the iteration where r1 may be set to j.
By paying for just a single iteration, our cost will be independent of the number of iterations |q |.
Consider the following winning coupling strategy:
(1) In loop iterations where i1 , j, select the following coupling (known as the null coupling):
Λ∅ = {(x1,x2, 0) | x1 − x2 = q1[i1] − q2[i2],x1,x2 ∈ Z}
This coupling incurs 0 privacy cost while ensuring that the two samples remain the same
distance apart as q1[i1] and q2[i2].
(2) In iteration i1 = j, select the following coupling (known as the shift coupling):
Λ+1 = {(x ,x + 1, ε) | x ∈ Z}
Let us explain the idea behind this strategy. In all iterations where i1 , j, the processes choose
two linked values in Λ∅ that differ by at most 1 (since |q1[i1] − q2[i2]| ⩽ 1). So the two processes
may take different branches of the conditional, and therefore disagree on the values of r1 and r2.
When i1 = j, we select the shift coupling Λ+1 to ensure that d2 = d1 + 1. Therefore, if r1 is set to j,
then r2 is set to j; this is because (i) i1 = i2 and (ii) d2 will have to be greater than any of the largest
values (best2) encountered by the second execution, forcing the second execution to enter the then
branch and update r2. Thus, this coupling strategy ensures that if r1 = j at the end of the execution,
then r2 = j. Since a privacy cost of ε is only incurred for the single iteration when i1 = j, each pair
of linked outputs has cost ε . This establishes ε-dp of rnm.
Constraint-Based Formulation of Coupling Proofs. We can view the coupling strategy as
assigning a first-order relation
strat(v, z1, z2,θ )
over (z1, z2,θ ) to every sampling instruction in the program. The vector of variables v contains
two copies the program variables, along with two logical variables representing the output ι we are
analyzing and the privacy parameter ε .
Fixing a particular program state c , we interpret strat(c, z1, z2,θ ) as a ternary relation over
Z×Z×R—a coupling of the two (integer-valued) distributions in the associated sampling instruction,
where θ records the cost of this coupling. Effectively, the relation strat encodes a function that
takes the current state of the two processesv as an input and returns a coupling.
Finding a winning coupling strategy, then, boils down to finding an appropriate interpretation
of the relation strat. To do so, we generate a system of constraints C whose solutions are winning
coupling strategies. A solution of C encodes a proof of ε-dp. For instance, our implementation finds
the following solution of strat for rnm (simplified for illustration):∧ i1 , ι =⇒ z1 − z2 = q1[i1] − q2[i2] ∧ θ = 0
i1 = ι =⇒ z2 = z1 + 1 ∧ θ = 2 · (ε/2)
This is a first-order Boolean formula whose satisfying assignments are elements of strat; the two
conjuncts encode the null and shift coupling, respectively.
Horn Modulo Couplings. More generally, we work with a novel combination of first-order-logic
constraints—in the form of constrained Horn clauses—and probabilistic coupling constraints. We call
our constraints Horn modulo couplings (hmc) constraints.
Below, we illustrate the more interesting hmc constraints generated by our system for rnm.
Suppose that the unknown relation invℓ captures the coupled invariant of the two processes at line
number ℓ. Just like an invariant for a sequential program encodes the set of reachable states at a
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program location, the coupled invariant describes the set of reachable states of the two executions
(along with privacy cost ω) assuming a particular coupling of the sampling instructions.
C1 : inv2(v,ω) ∧ i1 < |q1 | ∧ i2 < |q2 | −→ inv3(v,ω)
C2 : inv7(v,ω) −→ ω ⩽ ε ∧ (r1 = ι ⇒ r2 = ι)
C3 : inv3(v,ω) ∧ strat(v, z1, z2,θ ) ∧ ω ′ = ω + θ −→ inv4(v[d1 7→ z1,d2 7→ z2],ω ′)
Informally, a Horn clause is an implication (→) describing the flow of states between consecutive
lines of the program, and constraints on permissible states at each program location. Clause C1
encodes the loop entry condition: if both processes satisfy the loop-entry condition at line 2, then
both states are propagated to line 3. Clause C2 encodes the conditions for ε-dp at the end of the
program (line 7): the coupled invariant implies that incurred privacy cost ω is at most ε , and if the
first process returns ι, then so does the second process. ClauseC3 encodes the effect of selecting the
coupling from the strategy at line 3—ω is incremented by the privacy cost θ and d1,d2 are updated
to new values z1, z2, non-deterministically chosen from the coupling provided by the strategy.
Clauses 1–3 are standard constrained Horn clauses, but they are not enough: we need to en-
sure that strat encodes a coupling. So, our constraint system also features probabilistic coupling
constraints:
C4 : Lapε/2(q1[i1])↭strat(v,−,−,−) Lapε/2(q2[i2])
The constraint says that if we fix the first argumentv of strat to be the current state, the resulting
ternary relation is a coupling for the two distributions Lapε/2(q1[i1]) and Lapε/2(q2[i2]).
Solving hmc Constraints. To solve hmc constraints, we transform the coupling constraints into
standard Horn clauses with unknown expressions (uninterpreted functions). To sketch the idea,
observe that a strategy can be encoded by a formula of the following form:
(φ1 ⇒ Ψ1) ∧ · · · ∧ (φn ⇒ Ψn)
This describes a case statement: if the state of the processes satisfies φi , then select coupling
Ψi . To find formulas φi and Ψi , we transform solutions of strat to a formula of the above form,
parameterized by unknown expressions. By syntactically restricting Ψi to known couplings, we
end up with a system of Horn clauses with unknown expressions in φi and Ψi whose satisfying
assignments always satisfy the coupling constraints.
Finally, solving a system of Horn clauses with unknown expressions is similar to program
synthesis for programs with holes, where we want to find a completion that results in a correct
program; here, we want to synthesize a coupling strategy proving ε-dp. To implement our system,
we leverage automated techniques from program synthesis and program verification.
3 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND VARIABLE APPROXIMATE COUPLINGS
In this section we define our programmodel (§ 3.1) and ε-differential privacy (§ 3.2). We then present
variable approximate couplings (§ 3.3), which generalize the approximate couplings of Barthe et al.
[2017b, 2016b] and form the theoretical foundation for our coupling strategies proof method.
3.1 Program Model
Probability Distributions. To model probabilistic computation, we will use probability distribu-
tions and sub-distributions. A function µ : B → [0, 1] defines a sub-distribution over a countable
set B if
∑
b ∈B µ(b) ⩽ 1; when
∑
b ∈B µ(b) = 1, we call µ a distribution. We will often write µ(A) for a
subset A ⊆ B to mean ∑x ∈A µ(x). We write dist↓(B) and dist(B) for the set of all sub-distributions
and distributions over B, respectively.
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We will use a few standard constructions on sub-distributions. First, the support of a sub-
distribution µ is defined as supp(µ) = {b ∈ B | µ(b) > 0}. Second, for a sub-distribution on pairs
µ ∈ dist↓(B1×B2), the first and secondmarginals of µ, denoted π1(µ) and π2(µ), are sub-distributions
in dist↓(B1) and dist↓(B2):
π1(µ)(b1) ≜
∑
b2∈B2
µ(b1,b2) π2(µ)(b2) ≜
∑
b1∈B1
µ(b1,b2).
We will useM :W → dist↓(B) to denote a distribution family, which is a function mapping every
parameter in some set of distribution parametersW to a sub-distribution in dist↓(B).
Variables and Expressions. We will work with a simple computational model where programs
are labeled graphs. First, we fix a setV of program variables, the disjoint union of input variables V i
and local variables V l . Input variables model inputs to the program and are never modified—they
can also be viewed as logical variables. We assume that a special, real-valued input variable ε
contains the target privacy level. The set of local variables includes an output variable vr ∈ V l ,
representing the value returned by the program. We assume that each variable v has a type Dv ,
e.g., the Booleans B, the natural numbers N, or the integers Z.
We will consider several kinds of expressions, built out of variables. We will fix a collection of
primitive operations; for instance, arithmetic operations + and ·, Boolean operations =,∧,∨, etc.
We shall use exp to denote expressions over variables V , bexp to denote Boolean expressions over
V , and iexp to denote input expressions over V i . We consider a set of distribution expressions dexp
modeling primitive, built-in distributions. For our purposes, distribution expressions will model
standard distributions used in the differential privacy literature; we will detail these when we
introduce differential privacy below. Distribution expressions can be parameterized by standard
expressions.
Finally, wewill need three kinds of basic program statements st. An assignment statement v ← exp
stores the value of exp into the variable v . A sampling statement v ∼ dexp takes a fresh sample
from the distribution dexp and stores it into v . Finally, an assume statement assume(bexp) does
nothing if bexp is true, otherwise it filters out the execution (fails to terminate).
Programs. A program P = (L,E) is a directed graph where nodes L represent program locations,
directed edges E ⊆ L × L connect pairs of locations, and each edge e ∈ E is labeled by a statement
ste . There is a distinguished entry location ℓen ∈ L, representing the first instruction of the program,
and a return location ℓret ∈ L. We assume all locations in L can reach ℓret by following edges in E.
1 2
3
assume(x > 0)
as
su
m
e(
x

0)
x  x+ 1
while x > 0
x x+ 1
return x
1
2
3
Our program model is expressive enough to encode the usual
conditionals and loops from imperative languages—e.g., consider
the program on the right along with its graph representation.
All programs we consider model structured programs, e.g., there
is no control-flow non-determinism.
Expression Semantics. A program state s is a map assigning a value to each variable in V ; let S
denote the set of all possible states. Given variable v , we use s(v) to denote the value of v in state
s . Given constant c , we use s[v 7→ c] to denote the state s but with variable v mapped to c . The
semantics of an expression exp is a function JexpK : S → D from a state to an element of some
type D. For instance, the expression x + y in state s is interpreted as Jx + yK(s) = JxK(s) + JyK(s). A
distribution expression dexp is interpreted as a distribution family JdexpK : S → dist(Z), mapping
a state in S to a distribution over integers; for concreteness we will only consider distributions over
integers, but extending to arbitrary discrete distributions is straightforward. We will often write
s(−) to denote J−K(s), for simplicity.
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Program Semantics. We can define semantics of a program P as the aggregate of all its traces. A
trace σ through P is a finite sequence of statements ste1 , . . . , sten such that the associated edges edges
e1, . . . , en ∈ E form a directed path through the graph. A maximal trace σ has edges corresponding
to a path from ℓen to ℓret. We use Σ(P) to denote the set of all maximal traces through P . A trace σ
represents a sequence of instructions to be executed, sowe define JσK : S → dist↓(S) as a distribution
family from states to sub-distributions over states. Assignments and sampling statements are given
the expected semantics, and an assume(bexp) statement yields the all-zeros sub-distribution if the
input state does not satisfy the guard bexp. We can now define the semantics of a full programJPK : S → dist(S) as
JPK(s) ≜ ∑
σ ∈Σ(P )
JσK(s)
where the sum adds up output sub-distributions from each trace. We will assume P is terminating;
in particular, the sub-distributions JσK(s) sum to a proper distribution.
3.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a quantitative, statistical notion of data privacy proposed by Dwork et al.
[2006]; we reformulate their definition in our program model. We will fix an adjacency relation
on input states ∆ ⊆ S × S modeling which inputs should lead to similar outputs. Throughout, we
implicitly assume (i) for all (s1, s2) ∈ ∆, s1(ε) = s2(ε) > 0, and (ii) for all (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ and every
c ∈ R>0, (s1[ε 7→ c], s2[ε 7→ c]) ∈ ∆. In other words, in adjacent states ε may take any positive
value, as long as it is equal in both states.
Definition 3.1 (Dwork et al. [2006]). A program P is ε-differentially private with respect to an
adjacency relation ∆ iff for every (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ and output j ∈ Dvr ,
µ1({s | s(vr ) = j}) ⩽ exp(c) · µ2({s | s(vr ) = j})
where µ1 = P(s1), µ2 = P(s2), and s1(ε) = s2(ε) = c . ■
Dwork et al. [2006] originally defined differential privacy in terms of sets of outputs rather
than single outputs. Def. 3.1 is equivalent to their notion of (ε, 0)-differential privacy and is more
convenient for our purposes, as we will often prove privacy by focusing on one output at at time.
We will consider two primitive distributions that are commonly used in differentially private
algorithms: the (discrete) Laplace and exponential distributions. Both distributions are parameterized
by two numbers, describing the spread of the distribution and its center.
Definition 3.2. The Laplace distribution family is a function with two parameters, y ∈ R>0 and
z ∈ Z. We use Lapy (z) to denote the distribution over Z where Lapy (z)(ν ) ∝ exp(−|ν − z | · y), for
all ν ∈ Z. We call 1/y the scale of the distribution and z the mean of the distribution. ■
Definition 3.3. The exponential distribution family is a function with two parameters, y ∈ R>0
and z ∈ Z. We use Expy (z) to denote the distribution over Z where Expy (z)(ν ) = 0 for all ν < z,
and Expy (z)(ν ) ∝ exp(−(ν − z) · y) for all ν ⩾ z. ■
We will use distribution expressions Lapiexp(exp) and Expiexp(exp) to represent the respective
Laplace/exponential distribution interpreted in a given state. We assume that every pair of ad-
jacent states (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ satisfies s1(iexp) = s2(iexp) > 0 for every iexp appearing in distribution
expressions.
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3.3 Variable Approximate Couplings
We are now ready to define the concept of a variable approximate coupling, which we will use to
establish ε-dp of a program. A variable approximate coupling of two distributions µ1 and µ2 can be
viewed as two distributions on pairs, each modeling one of the original distributions. Formally:
Definition 3.4 (Variable approximate couplings). Let µ1 ∈ dist↓(B1) and µ2 ∈ dist↓(B2). Let Λ ⊆
B1 × B2 × R⩾0 be a relation. We write dom(Λ) ⊆ B1 × B2 for the projection of Λ to the first two
components. We say that Λ is a variable approximate coupling of µ1 and µ2—denoted µ1 ↭Λ µ2—if
there exist two witness sub-distributions µL ∈ dist↓(B1 × B2) and µR ∈ dist↓(B1 × B2) such that:
(1) π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR ) ⩽ µ2,
(2) supp(µL), supp(µR ) ⊆ dom(Λ), and
(3) for all (b1,b2, c) ∈ Λ, we have µL(b1,b2) ⩽ exp(c) · µR (b1,b2).
We will call these the marginal conditions, the support conditions, and the distance conditions
respectively. We will often abbreviate “variable approximate coupling” as simply “coupling”. ■
To give some intuition, the first point states that µL models the first distribution and µR is a lower
bound on the second distribution—the inequality π2(µR ) ⩽ µ2 means that π2(µR )(b2) ⩽ µ2(b2) for
every b2 ∈ B2. Informally, since the definition of differential privacy (Def. 3.1) is asymmetric, it is
enough to show that the first distribution (which we will model by µL) is less than a lower bound
of the second distribution (which we will model by µR ). The second point states that every pair of
elements with non-zero probability in µL or µR must have at least one cost. Finally, the third point
states that µL is approximately upper bounded by µR ; the approximation is determined by a cost c
at each pair.
Our definition is a richer version of ⋆-lifting, an approximate coupling recently proposed by
Barthe et al. [2017b] for verifying differential privacy. The main difference is our approximation level
c may vary over the pairs (b1,b2), hence we call our approximate coupling a variable approximate
coupling. When all approximation levels are the same, our definition recovers the existing definition
of⋆-lifting.3 Variable approximate couplings can give more precise bounds when comparing events
in the first distribution to events in the second distribution.
Now, ε-dp holds if we can find a coupling of the output distributions from adjacent inputs.
Lemma 3.5 (ε-dp and couplings). A program P is ε-dp with respect to adjacency relation ∆ if for
every (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ and j ∈ Dvr , there is a coupling P(s1)↭Λj P(s2) with
Λj = {(s ′1, s ′2, c) | s ′1(vr ) = j ⇒ s ′2(vr ) = j},
where s1(ε) = s2(ε) = c .
We close this section with some examples of specific couplings for the Laplace and exponential
distributions proposed by Barthe et al. [2016b].
Definition 3.6 (Shift coupling). Let y ∈ R>0, z1, z2 ∈ Z, and k ∈ Z, and define the relations
Λ+k ≜ {(n1,n2, |k+z1−z2 |·y) | n1+k = n2} and Λ′+k ≜ {(n1,n2, (k+z1−z2)·y) | n1+k = n2}
Then we have the following shift coupling for the Laplace distribution:
Lapy (z1)↭Λ+k Lapy (z2).
If k + z1 − z2 ⩾ 0, we have the following shift coupling for the exponential distribution:
Expy (z1)↭Λ
′
+k Expy (z2).
3More precisely, (ε, 0) ⋆-lifting.
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Intuitively, these couplings relate each sample n1 from the first distribution with the sample
n2 = n1 + k from the second distribution. The difference in probabilities for these two samples
depends on the shift k and the difference between the means z1, z2. ■
If we set k = z2 − z1 above, the coupling cost is 0 and we have the following useful special case.
Definition 3.7 (Null coupling). Let y ∈ R>0, z1, z2 ∈ Z, and define the relation:
Λ∅ ≜ {(n1,n2, 0) | n1 − z1 = n2 − z2}.
Then we have the following null couplings:
Lapy (z1)↭Λ∅ Lapy (z2) and Expy (z1)↭Λ∅ Expy (z2).
Intuitively, these couplings relate pairs of samples n1,n2 that are at the same distance from their re-
spective means z1, z2—the approximation level is 0 since linked samples have the same probabilities
under their respective distributions. ■
4 COUPLING STRATEGIES
In this section, we introduce coupling strategies, our proof technique for establishing ε-dp.
4.1 Formalizing Coupling Strategies
Roughly speaking, a coupling strategy picks a coupling for each sampling statement.
Definition 4.1 (Coupling strategies). Let Stmts be the set of all sampling statements in a program
P ; recall that our primitive distributions are over the integers Z. A coupling strategy τ for P is a
map from Stmts × S × S to couplings in 2Z×Z×R, such that for a statement st = v ∼ dexp and states
(s1, s2), the relation τ (st, s1, s2) ⊆ Z ×Z ×R forms a coupling s1(dexp)↭τ (st,s1,s2) s2(dexp). ■
Example 4.2. Recall our simple coupling strategy for Report Noisy Max in § 2.1. For the statement
st = v ∼ Lapε/2(q[i]), and every pair of states (s1, s2) where s1(ε) = s2(ε) = c > 0, the strategy τ
returned the coupling τ (st, s1, s2) = {(x ,x , c) | x ∈ Z}. ■
To describe the effect of a coupling strategy on two executions from neighboring inputs, we
define a coupled postcondition operation. This operation propagates a set of pairs of coupled states
while tracking the privacy cost from couplings selected along the execution path.
Definition 4.3 (Coupled postcondition). Let τ be a coupling strategy for P . We define the coupled
postcondition as a function postτ , mapping Q ⊆ S × S ×R and a statement to a subset of S × S ×R:
postτ (Q,v ← exp) ≜ {(s1[v 7→ s1(exp)], s2[v 7→ s2(exp)], c) | (s1, s2, c) ∈ Q}
postτ (Q, assume(bexp)) ≜ {(s1, s2, c) | (s1, s2, c) ∈ Q ∧ s1(bexp) ∧ s2(bexp)}
postτ (Q,v ∼ dexp) ≜ {(s1[v 7→ a1], s2[v 7→ a2], c + c ′)
| (s1, s2, c) ∈ Q ∧ (a1,a2, c ′) ∈ τ (v ∼ dexp, s1, s2)}.
This operation can be lifted to operate on sequences of statements σ in the standard way: when
the trace σ = st1σ ′ begins with st1, we define postτ (Q,σ ) ≜ postτ (postτ (Q, st1),σ ′); when σ is the
empty trace, postτ (Q,σ ) ≜ Q . ■
Intuitively, on assignment statements post updates every pair of states (s1, s2) using the semantics
of assignment; on assume statements, post only propagates pairs of states satisfying bexp; on
sampling statements, post updates every pair of states (s1, s2) by assigning the variables (v1,v2)
with every possible pair from the coupling chosen by τ , updating the incurred privacy costs.
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Example 4.4. Consider a simple program:
x ← x + 10
x ∼ Lapε (x)
Let the adjacency relation ∆ = {(s1, s2) | s1(x) = s2(x) + 1 and s1(ε) = s2(ε) = c} and let τ be a
coupling strategy. Since there is only a single variable x and ε is fixed to c , we will represent the
states of the two processes by x1 and x2, respectively. Then, the initial set of coupled states Q0 is
the set {(x1,x2, 0) | x1 = x2 + 1}. First, we compute Q1 = postτ (Q0,x ← x + 10). This results in a
set Q1 = Q0, since adding 10 to both variables does not change the fact that x1 = x2 + 1. Next, we
compute Q2 = postτ (Q1,x ∼ dexp). Suppose that the coupling strategy τ maps every pair of states
(s1, s2) ∈ Q1 to the coupling Λ= = {(k,k, c) | k ∈ Z}. Then, Q2 = {(x1,x2, c) | x1 = x2}. ■
While a coupling strategy restricts the pairs of executions we must consider, the executions may
still behave quite differently—for instance, they may take different paths at conditional statements
or run for different numbers of loop iterations, etc. To further simplify the verification task we will
focus on synchronizing strategies only, which ensure that the guard in every assume instruction
takes the same value on coupled pairs, so both coupled processes follow the same control-flow path
through the program.
Definition 4.5 (Synchronizing coupling strategies). Given a trace σ , let σi denote the prefix
st1, . . . , sti of σ and let σ0 denote the empty trace that simply returns the input state. A cou-
pling strategy τ is synchronizing for σ and (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ iff for every sti = assume(bexp) and
(s ′1, s ′2,−) ∈ postτ ({(s1, s2, 0)},σi−1), we have s ′1(bexp) = s ′2(bexp). ■
Requiring synchronizing coupling strategies is a certainly a restriction, but not a serious one
for proving differential privacy. By treating conditional statements as monolithic instructions, the
only potential branching we need to consider comes from loops. Differentially private algorithms
use straightforward iteration; all examples we are aware of can be encoded with for-loops and
analyzed synchronously. (§ 7 provides more details about how we handle branching.)
4.2 Proving Differential Privacy via Coupling Strategies
Our main theoretical result shows that synchronizing coupling strategies encode couplings.
Lemma 4.6 (From strategies to couplings). Suppose τ is synchronizing for σ and (s1, s2) ∈ ∆.
Let Ψ = postτ ({(s1, s2, 0)},σ ), and let f : S × S → R be such that c ⩽ f (s ′1, s ′2) for all (s ′1, s ′2, c) ∈ Ψ.
Then we have a coupling σ (s1)↭Ψf σ (s2), where Ψf ≜ {(s ′1, s ′2, f (s ′1, s ′2)) | (s ′1, s ′2,−) ∈ Ψ}.
Proof. (Sketch) By induction on the length of the trace σ . ■
There may be multiple sampling choices that yield the same coupled outputs (s ′1, s ′2); the coupling
must assign a cost larger than all associated costs in the coupled post-condition. By Lem. 3.5, if we
can find a coupling for each possible output j ∈ Dvr such that s1(vr ) = j =⇒ s2(vr ) = j with cost
at most ε , then we establish ε-differential privacy. We formalize this family of coupling strategies
as a winning coupling strategy.
Theorem 4.7 (Winning coupling strategies). Fix program P and adjacency relation ∆. Suppose
that we have a family of coupling strategies {τj }j ∈Dvr such that for every trace σ ∈ Σ(P) and j ∈ Dvr ,
τj is synchronizing for σ and
postτj (∆ × {0},σ ) ⊆ {(s ′1, s ′2, c) | c ⩽ s1(ε) ∧ s ′1(vr ) = j ⇒ s ′2(vr ) = j}.
Then P is ε-differentially private. (We could change s1(ε) to s2(ε) above, since s1(ε) = s2(ε) in ∆.)
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Proof. Let (s1, s2) ∈ ∆ be two input states such that s1(ε) = s2(ε) = c . For every j ∈ Dvr and any
sequence σ ∈ Σ(P), Lem. 4.6 gives a coupling of the output distributions: σ (s1)↭Λ σ (s2) where
s ′1(vr ) = j =⇒ s ′2(vr ) = j and c ′ ⩽ c for every (s ′1, s ′2, c ′) ∈ Λ. By a similar argument as in Lem. 3.5,
we have
σ (s1)({s ′1 | s ′1(vr ) = j}) ⩽ exp(c) · σ (s2)({s ′2 | s ′2(vr ) = j}).
Since JPK = ∑σ ∈Σ(P )JσK, summing over all traces σ ∈ Σ(P) shows ε-differential privacy:
P(s1)({s ′1 | s ′1(vr ) = j}) ⩽ exp(c) · P(s2)({s ′2 | s ′2(vr ) = j}). ■
5 HORN CLAUSES MODULO COUPLINGS
So far, we have seen how to prove differential privacy by finding a winning coupling strategy. In
this section we present a constraint-based formulation of winning coupling strategies, paving the
way to automation.
5.1 Enriching Horn clauses with Coupling Constraints
Constrained Horn clauses are a standard tool for logically encoding verification proof rules [Bjørner
et al. 2015; Grebenshchikov et al. 2012b]. For example, a set of Horn clauses can describe a loop
invariant, a rely-guarantee proof, an Owicki-Gries proof, a ranking function, etc. Since our proofs—
winning coupling strategies—describe probabilistic couplings, our Horn clauses will involve a new
kind of probabilistic constraint.
Horn Clauses. We assume formulas are interpreted in some first-order theory (e.g., linear integer
arithmetic) with a set R of uninterpreted relation symbols. A constrained Horn clause C , or Horn
clause for short, is a first-order logic formula of the form
r1(v1) ∧ r2(v2) ∧ . . . ∧ rn−1(vn−1) ∧ φ −→ HC
where:
• each relation ri ∈ R is of arity equal to the length of the vector of variablesvi ;
• φ is an interpreted formula over the first-order theory (e.g., x > 0);
• the left-hand side of the implication (−→) is called the body of C; and
• HC , the head of C , is either a relation application rn(vn) or an interpreted formula φ ′.
We will allow interpreted formulas to contain disjunctions. For clarity of presentation, we will use
⇒ to denote implications in an interpreted formula, and→ to denote the implication in a Horn
clause. All free variables are assumed to be universally quantified, e.g., x +y > 0 −→ r (x ,y) means
∀x ,y. x + y > 0 −→ r (x ,y). For conciseness we often write r (v,x1, . . . ,xm) to denote the relation
application r (v1, . . . ,vn ,x1, . . . ,xm), wherev is the vector of variables v1, . . . ,vn .
Semantics. We will write C for a set of clauses {C1, . . . ,Cn}. Let G be a graph over relation
symbols such that there is an edge (r1, r2) iff r1 appears in the body of some clauseCi and r2 appears
in its head. We say that C is recursive iff G has a cycle. The set C is satisfiable if there exists an
interpretation ρ of relation symbols as relations in the theory such that every clause C ∈ C is valid.
We say that ρ satisfies C (denoted ρ |= C) iff for all C ∈ C, ρC is valid (i.e., equivalent to true),
where ρC is C with every relation application r (v) replaced by ρ(r (v)).
The next example uses Horn clauses to prove a simple Hoare triple for a standard, deterministic
program. For a detailed exposition of Horn clauses in verification, we refer to the excellent survey
by Bjørner et al. [2015].
Example 5.1. Consider the simple program P and its graph representation in Fig. 3. Suppose we
want to prove the Hoare triple {x = y} P {x ⩽ y}. We generate the Horn clauses shown in Fig. 3,
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1 2
3
assume(x+ y > 5)
as
su
m
e(
x
+
y

5)
x  x  1
while x+ y > 5
x x  1
return x
1
2
3
C1 : x = y −→ r1(x, y) precondition
C2 : r1(x, y) ∧ x + y > 5 −→ r2(x, y) loop entry
C3 : r2(x, y) ∧ x ′ = x − 1 −→ r1(x ′, y) loop body
C4 : r1(x, y) ∧ x + y ⩽ 5 −→ r3(x, y) loop exit
C5 : r3(x, y) −→ x ⩽ y postcondition
Fig. 3. Example of using Horn clauses for proving a Hoare triple
where relations ri denote the Hoare-style annotation at location i of P . Each clause encodes either
the pre/postcondition or the semantics of one of the program statements.
Notice that the constraint system is recursive. Intuitively, ri captures all reachable states at
location i; relation r1 encodes an inductive loop invariant that holds at the loop head. We can give a
straightforward reading of each clause. For instance, C3 states that if (x ,y) is reachable at location
2, then (x − 1,y) must be reachable at location 1; C5 stipulates that all states reachable at location 5
must be such that x ⩽ y, i.e., satisfy the postcondition.
One possible satisfying assignment ρ to these constraints is ρ(ri ) = {(a,b) | a ⩽ b} for i ∈ [1, 3].
Applying ρ to r1(x ,y) results in x ⩽ y, the loop invariant. We can interpret C1 and C3 under ρ:
ρC1 : x = y −→ x ⩽ y ρC3 : x ⩽ y ∧ x ′ = x − 1 −→ x ′ ⩽ y
Observe that all ρCi are valid, establishing validity of the original Hoare triple. ■
Horn Clauses Modulo Coupling Constraints. We now enrich Horn clauses with a new form of
constraint that describes couplings between pairs of distributions; we call the resulting constraints
Horn modulo couplings (hmc).
Definition 5.2 (Coupling constraints). Suppose we have a relation r of arity n + 3 for some n ⩾ 0,
and suppose we have two distribution familiesM1 andM2. A coupling constraint is of the form:
M(v1)↭r (v3,−,−,−) M(v2)
An interpretation ρ satisfies such a constraint iff for every consistent assignment c1,c2,c3 to the
variables v1, v2, v3, we have M(c1) ↭ρ(r (c 3,−,−,−)) M(c2), where ρ(r (c3,−,−,−)) is defined as
{(k1,k2,θ ) | (c3,k1,k2,θ ) ∈ ρ(r )}. In other words, ρ(r (c3,−,−,−)) is the ternary relation resulting
from fixing the first n components of ρ(r ) to c3. Note that the vectors {vi }i may share variables. ■
Example 5.3. Consider the simple coupling constraint Lapc (x1)↭r (x1,x2,−,−,−) Lapc (x2), where
c is a positive constant. A simple satisfying assignment is the null coupling from Def. 3.7:
ρ(r ) = {(a1,a2,b1,b2, 0) | b1 − b2 = a1 − a2}
Effectively, ρ(r ) says: for any values (a1,a2) of (x1,x2), the relationΛ∅ = {(b1,b2, 0) | b1−b2 = a1−a2}
is a coupling such that Lapc (a1)↭Λ∅ Lapc (a2). ■
Example 5.4. For a simpler example, consider the constraint Lapc (x)↭r (−,−,−) Lapc (x), where
c is a positive constant. A satisfying assignment to this constraint is: ρ(r ) = {(b1,b2, 0) | b1 = b2},
since the two distributions are the same for any value of variable x . Another possible satisfying
assignment is ρ(r ) = {(b1,b2, 2c) | b1 + 2 = b2}, by the shift coupling (Def. 3.6). ■
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init
∆ ∧ ω = 0→ invℓen (v, 0) ∈ C
dpriv
invℓret (v, ω) → ω ⩽ ε ∧ (vr1 = ι ⇒ vr2 = ι) ∈ C
e = (i, j) ∈ L ste = v ← exp
assign
invi (v, ω) ∧ v ′1 = expr1 ∧ v ′2 = expr2 → invj (v [v ′], ω) ∈ C
e = (i, j) ∈ L ste = assume(bexp)
assume
invi (v, ω) ∧ bexpr1 ∧ bexpr2 → invj (v, ω) ∈ C
e = (i, j) ∈ L ste = assume(bexp)
assume-s
invi (v, ω) → bexpr1 ≡ bexpr2 ∈ C
e = (i, j) ∈ L ste = v ∼ dexp
strat
invi (v, ω) ∧ strate (v, v ′1, v ′2, θ ) → invj (v [v ′], ω + θ ) ∈ C
e = (i, j) ∈ L ste = v ∼ dexp
couple
dexp1 ↭strate (v,−,−,−) dexp2 ∈ C
We use v [v ′] to denote the vector v but with variables v1 and v2 replaced by their primed versions, v ′1 and v ′2.
Fig. 4. Generating Horn modulo coupling constraints
5.2 Generating Horn clauses from Programs
For a program P , we generate clauses C specifying a winning coupling strategy {τj }j ∈Dvr ; as we
saw in Thm. 4.7, a winning coupling strategy implies ε-differential privacy. A winning coupling
strategy ensures that the coupled postcondition postτj (∆ × {0},σ ) satisfies certain conditions
for every trace σ ∈ Σ(P). We thus generate a set of constraints whose solutions capture all sets
postτj (∆ × {0},σ ). Since the set Σ(P) is potentially infinite (due to loops), we generate a recursive
system of constraints. Rather than find a coupling strategy separately for each possible output
value j, we will parameterize our constraints by a logical variable ι representing a possible output.
Invariant and Strategy Relations. Our generated constraints C mention two unknown relations.
• invi (v,ω) encodes the coupled invariant at location i ∈ L in the program. This relation
captures the set of coupled states postτj (∆ × {0},σ ) for traces σ that begin at location ℓen and
end at location i . The first-order variablesv model two copies of program variables for the
two executions of P , tagged with subscript 1 or 2, respectively, along with the logical variable
ι representing a possible return value in Dvr . The variable ω models the accumulated cost for
the particular coupled states and program location.
• strate (v,v ′1,v ′2,θ ) encodes the coupling strategy for sampling statement ste . If the values of
v model two program states, strate encodes a coupling between the distributions in ste .
Constraint Generation. Given a program P and adjacency relation ∆, the rules in Fig. 4 define a
set C of constraints. The rule couple generates a coupling constraint for a sampling statement; all
other rules generate standard constrained Horn clauses.
Before walking through the rules, we first set some notation. We use exp1 (resp. exp2) to denote
exp with all its variables tagged with subscript 1 (resp. 2). As is standard, we assume there is a
one-to-one correspondence between expressions in our language and our first-order theory, e.g., if
bexp is x > 0 and x is of type Z, then we treat bexp1 as the constraint x1 > 0 in the theory of linear
integer arithmetic. We assume that the adjacency relation ∆ is a formula in our first-order theory.
Finally, technically there are two distinct input variables ε1 and ε2 representing the target privacy
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level. Since these variables are assumed to be equal in any two adjacent states, we will simply use a
single variable ε in the constraints.
Now, we take a closer look at the constraint generation rules. The first two rules describe the
initial and final states: the rule init specifies that the invariant at ℓen contains all adjacent states
and ω is 0. The rule dpriv states that the invariant at ℓret satisfies the ε-dp conditions in Thm. 4.7
for every return value ι and every ε > 0.
The next three rules describe the coupled postcondition for deterministic statements. The rule
assign encodes the effect of executing v ← exp in the two executions of the program. Primed
variables, e.g., v ′1, to denote the modified (new) value of v1 after assignment. The rule assume
encodes effects of assume statements, and assume-s ensures both processes are synchronized at
assume statements.
The last two rules encode sampling statements. The rule strat generates a clause that uses the
coupling encoded by strate to constrain the values of v ′1 and v ′2 and increments the privacy cost ω
by θ . The rule couple generates a coupling constraint specifying that strate encodes a coupling of
the distributions in the two executions. We interpret the distribution expressions dexp1, dexp2 as
distribution families, parameterized by the state.
Example 5.5. For illustration, let us walk through the constraints generated for the simple
program from Ex. 4.4, reproduced below. Assume the adjacency relation is |x1 − x2 | ⩽ 1 ∧ ε > 0,
and let the vectorv contain the variables {x1,x2, ε, ι}. We writev[x ′] forv[x1 7→ x ′1,x2 7→ x ′2] (as
described at the bottom of Fig. 4). Then, the following constraints are generated by the indicated
rules from Fig. 4.
1: x ← x + 10
2: x ∼ Lapε (x)
3: return x
|x1 − x2 | ⩽ 1 ∧ ε > 0 ∧ ω = 0 −→ inv1(v,ω) init
inv1(v,ω) ∧ x ′1 = x1 + 10 ∧ x ′2 = x2 + 10 −→ inv2(v[x ′],ω) assign
inv2(v,ω) ∧ strat(v[x ′],x ′1,x ′2,θ ) −→ inv3(v[x ′],ω + θ ) strat
inv3(v,ω) −→ ω ⩽ ε ∧ (x1 = ι ⇒ x2 = ι) dpriv
Lapε (x1)↭strat(v,−,−,−) Lapε (x2) couple
The relation strat describes the coupling for the single sampling statement. ■
Soundness. To connect our constraint system to winning coupling strategies, the main soundness
lemma states that a satisfying assignment ρ of C encodes a winning coupling strategy.
Lemma 5.6. Let ρ |= C, where C is generated for a program P and adjacency relation ∆. Define a
family of coupling strategies {τj }j ∈Dvr for P by
τj (ste , s1, s2) = {(a,a′, c) | (q j ,a,a′, c) ∈ ρ(strate )}
for every sampling statement ste in P and every pair of states (s1, s2), where q j replaces each tagged
program variable inv with the value in s1 and s2 respectively, and sets the output variable ι to j . Then,
{τj }j is a winning coupling strategy.
Now soundness is immediate by Lem. 5.6 and Thm. 4.7.
Theorem 5.7 (Soundness of constraints). Let C be a system of constraints generated for
program P and adjacency relation ∆, as per Fig. 4. If C is satisfiable, then P is ε-differentially private.
6 PARAMETERIZED COUPLING FAMILIES
In this section, we demonstrate how to transform the probabilistic coupling constraints into more
standard logical constraints. We introduce parameterized families of couplings (§ 6.1) and then
show how to use them to eliminate coupling constraints (§ 6.2).
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Name Distribution family Precondition Coupling family Coupling params.
Null (Lap) Lapε [z1], Lapε [z2] – Λ∅[z1, z2] –
Shift (Lap) Lapε [z1], Lapε [z2] – Λ+k [z1, z2] k ∈ Z
Choice (Lap) Lapε [z1], Lapε [z2] NO(Π, Λ+k [z1, z2], Λ∅[z1, z2]) (Π ? Λ+k [z1, z2] : Λ∅[z1, z2]) k ∈ Z, Π ⊆ Z
Null (Exp) Expε [z1], Expε [z2] – Λ∅[z1, z2] –
Shift (Exp) Expε [z1], Expε [z2] z2 − z1 ⩽ k Λ′+k [z1, z2] k ∈ Z
Table 1. Coupling families (selection)
6.1 Coupling families
Since coupling strategies select couplings for distribution expressions instead of purelymathematical
distributions, it will be useful to consider couplings between two families of distributionsM1,M2
parametrized by variables, rather than just between two concrete distributions.
Definition 6.1 (Coupling families). Let M1,M2 be two distribution families with distribution
parameters in some setW . Then, a coupling family Λ[w1,w2] forM1 andM2 assigns a coupling
M1[w1]↭Λ[w1,w2] M2[w2]
for all (w1,w2) ∈ preΛ, where preΛ ⊆W ×W is a precondition on the parameter combinations.
We use square brackets to emphasize the distribution parameters. ■
Besides distribution parameters—which model the state of the distributions—couplings can also
depend on logical parameters independent of the state. We call this second class of parameters
coupling parameters. Table 1 lists the selection of couplings we discuss in this section along with
their preconditions and coupling parameters; the distribution parameters are indicated by the
square brackets.
Null and shift coupling families. In § 3, we saw two examples of couplings for the Laplace
and Exponential distributions: the shift coupling (Def. 3.6) and the null coupling (Def. 3.7). These
couplings are examples of coupling families in that they specify a coupling for a family of distri-
butions. For instance, the Laplace distribution has the mean value z as a distribution parameter;
we will write Lapε [z] instead of Lapε (z) when we want to emphasize this dependence.4 The
null and shift coupling families couple the distribution families Lapε [z1], Lapε [z2] for any two
z1, z2 ∈ Z. For example, for a fixed z1, z2, we have the shift coupling Lapε (z1) ↭Λ+k Lapε (z1),
where Λ+k = {(n1,n2, |k + z1 − z2 |ε) | n1 + k = n2}. Notice that k ∈ Z is a coupling parameter;
depending on what we set it to, we get different couplings.
In the case of the exponential distribution, the shift coupling family couples the families Expε [z1]
and Expε [z2] under the precondition that z2 − z1 ⩽ k .
Choice coupling. We will also use a novel coupling construction, the choice coupling, which allow
us to combine two couplings, using a predicate on the first sample space to decide which coupling
to apply. If the two couplings satisfy a non-overlapping condition, the result is again a coupling.
This construction is inspired by ideas from Zhang and Kifer [2017], who demonstrate how the
pairing between samples (randomness alignment) can be selected depending on the result of the
first sample. These richer couplings can simplify privacy proofs (and hence solutions to invariants
in our constraints), in some cases letting us construct a single proof that works for all possible
output values instead of building a different proof for each output value.
Lemma 6.2 (Choice coupling). Let µ1 ∈ dist↓(B), µ2 ∈ dist↓(B) be two sub-distributions, and let
Π be a predicate on B. Suppose that there are two couplings µ1 ↭Λ µ2 and µ1 ↭Λ
′
µ2, and suppose
4Properly speaking ε should be considered a parameter as well. To reduce notation, we will suppress this dependence and
treat ε as a constant for this section.
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that Λ,Λ′ satisfy the following non-overlapping condition: for every pair a1 ∈ Π,a′1 < Π and a2 ∈ B,
(a1,a2,−) ∈ Λ and (a′1,a2,−) ∈ Λ′ do not both hold. We abbreviate the non-overlapping condition as
NO(Π,Λ,Λ′). In other words, there is no element a2 that is related under Λ to an element in Π and
related under Λ′ to an element not in Π. Then the following relation
(Π ? Λ : Λ′) ≜ {(a1,a2, c) | (a1 ∈ Π =⇒ Λ(a1,a2, c)) ∧ (a1 < Π =⇒ Λ′(a1,a2, c))}
is a coupling µ1 ↭(Π?Λ:Λ
′) µ2.
Proof. Let (µL, µR ) be witnesses for the coupling Λ, and let (µ ′L, µ ′R ) be witnesses for the coupling
Λ′. Then we can define witnesses νL,νR for the choice coupling (Π ? Λ : Λ′):
νL(a1,a2) ≜
{
µL(a1,a2) : a1 ∈ Π
µ ′L(a1,a2) : a1 < Π
and νR (a1,a2) ≜
{
µR (a1,a2) : a1 ∈ Π
µ ′R (a1,a2) : a1 < Π.
The support and distance conditions follow from the support and distance conditions for (µL, µR )
and (µ ′L, µ ′R ). The first marginal condition for νL follows from the first marginal conditions for µL
and µ ′L , while the second marginal condition for νR follows from the second marginal conditions
for µR and µ ′R combined with the non-overlapping condition on Π, Λ, and Λ
′. ■
We can generalize a choice coupling to a coupling family. Suppose we have two coupling families
Λ[.],Λ′[.] for some distribution families M1[.], M2[.], then we can generate a coupling family
(Π,Λ[.],Λ′[.]) whose coupling parameters are the predicate Π and the parameters of the two
families. (Note that Π could also have parameters.) In the example below, and in Table 1, we give
one possible choice coupling for the Laplace distribution. An analogous construction applies for
the exponential distribution
Example 6.3. Consider the following two coupling families for the Laplace distribution family:
the shift coupling Λ+k [z1, z2] and the null coupling Λ∅[z1, z2]. Then, we have the coupling family
Lapε [z1]↭(Π?Λ+k [z1,z2]:Λ∅[z1,z2]) Lapε [z2].
under the precondition NO(Π,Λ+k [z1, z2],Λ∅[z1, z2]). The parameters of this coupling family are
the predicate Π ⊆ Z and the parameter k ∈ Z of Λ+k [z1, z2]. For one possible instantiation, let Π
be the predicate {x ∈ Z | x ⩾ 0} and let k = 1. Then if |z1 −z2 | ⩽ 1, the non-overlapping condition
holds and (Π ? Λ+1[z1, z2] : Λ∅[z1, z2]) is a coupling. ■
6.2 Transforming Horn clauses
Now, we can transform hmc constraints and eliminate coupling constraints by restricting solutions
of coupling constraints to use the previous coupling families. We model coupling parameters and
the logic of the coupling strategy by Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions.
Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions. Recall our Horn clauses may mention uninter-
preted relation symbols R. We now assume an additional set F of uninterpreted function symbols,
which can appear in interpreted formulas φ in the body/head of a clause C . A function symbol
f ∈ F of arity n can be applied to a vector of variables of length n; for example, consider the clause
r1(x) ∧ f (x ,y) = z −→ r2(z)
In addition to mapping each relation symbol r ∈ R to a relation, an interpretation ρ now also maps
each function symbol f ∈ F to a function definable in the theory—intuitively, an expression. We
say that ρ |= C iff ρC is valid for allC ∈ C, where ρC also replaces every function application f (v)
by ρ(f (v)).
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enc(Λ∅[z1, z2]) ≜ d1 − z1 = d2 − z2 ∧ θ = 0
enc(Λ+k [z1, z2]) ≜ d1 + fk () = d2 ∧ θ = |z1 − z2 + fk () | · ε
enc(Π ? Λ+k [z1, z2] : Λ∅[z1, z2]) ≜ (fb (d1) ⇒ enc(Λ+k [z1, z2])) ∧ (¬fb (d1) ⇒ enc(Λ∅[z1, z2]))
enc(Λ′
+k [z1, z2]) ≜ d1 + fk () = d2 ∧ θ = (z1 − z2 + fk ()) · ε
enc(preΛ′
+k [z1,z2]) ≜ z2 − z1 ⩽ fk ()
enc(pre(Π?Λ+k [z1,z2]:Λ∅[z1,z2])) ≜
(
fb (d1) ∧ ¬fb (d ′1) ∧ enc(Λ+k [z1, z2]) ∧ enc(Λ∅[z1, z2])′
) ⇒ d2 , d ′2
Fig. 5. Encodings of coupling families. We use φ ′ to denote φ with every variable x replaced by x ′.
Example 6.4. To give an intuition for the semantics, consider the two simple clauses:
C1 : x = y − 5 −→ r (x ,y) C2 : r (x ,y) ∧ f (x) = z −→ z > y
A possible satisfying assignment ρ maps r (x ,y) to the formula x = y − 5 (ensuring that the first
clause is valid) and f (x) to the expression x + 6 (ensuring that the second clause is valid). ■
Roughly, we can view the problem of solving a set of Horn clauses {C1, . . . ,Cn} as solving a
formula of the form ∃f1, . . . , fm . ∃r1, . . . , rl .∧i Ci : Find an interpretation of fi and ri such that∧
i Ci is valid. In our setting, fi will correspond to pieces of the coupling strategy and ri will be the
invariants showing that the coupling strategy establishes differential privacy.
Transforming coupling constraints. To transform coupling constraints into Horn clauses
with uninterpreted functions, we encode each coupling family Λ[w1,w2] as a first-order formula,
enc(Λ[w1,w2]), along with its precondition. The encodings for the families we consider from Table 1
are shown in Fig. 5, where fk () is a fresh nullary (constant) uninterpreted function that is shared
between the encoding of a family and its precondition. Similarly, fb (·) is a fresh uninterpreted
function ranging over Booleans, representing a predicate.
With the encodings of coupling families, we are ready to define the transformation.
Definition 6.5 (Coupling constraint transformer). Suppose we have a coupling constraint
M1(v1)↭r (v,−,−,−) M2[v2]
Suppose we have a set of possible coupling families Λ1[v1,v2], . . . ,Λn[v1,v2] forM1[v1],M2[v2].
We transform the coupling constraint into the following set of Horn clauses, where we use A↔ B
to denote the pair of Horn clausesA→ B and B → A, and we use f to denote a fresh uninterpreted
function with range {1, . . . ,n}:(
n∧
i=1
f (v) = i =⇒ enc(Λi [v1,v2])
)
←→ r (v,d1,d2,θ )
f (v) = 1 −→ enc(preΛ1 [v1,v2]) · · · f (v) = n −→ enc(preΛn [v1,v2])
Without loss of generality, we assume that variables d1,d2,θ do not appear inv,v1,v2.
Intuitively, the first clause selects which of the n couplings we pick, depending on the valuesv .
The remaining clauses ensure that whenever we pick a coupling Λi , we satisfy its precondition. ■
Example 6.6. Recall our Report Noisy Max example from § 2. There, we encoded the single
sampling statement using the following coupling constraint:
C4 : Lapε/2(q1[i1])↭strat(v,−,−,−) Lapε/2(q2[i2])
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Suppose we take the null and shift coupling families for Laplace as our possible couplings. Our
transformation produces:∧ f (v) = 1 =⇒ (d ′1 − d ′2 = q1[i1] − q2[i2] ∧ θ = 0)
f (v) = 2 =⇒ (d ′1 + fk () = d ′2 ∧ θ = |q1[i1] − q2[i2] + fk ()| · (ε/2)) ←→ strat(v,d ′1,d ′2,θ )
We omit clauses enforcing the trivial precondition (true) for these coupling families.
The first conjunct on the left encodes application of the null coupling; the second conjunct
encodes the shift coupling. The unknowns are the function f and the constant function fk . As we
sketched in § 2, our tool discovers the interpretation ite(i1 , ι, 1, 2) for f (v) and the constant 1 for
fk (), where ite(b,a,a′) denotes the expression that is a if b is true and a′ otherwise. ■
The following theorem formalizes soundness of our transformation.
Theorem 6.7 (Soundness of transformation). Let C be a set of Horn clauses with coupling
constraints. Let C′ be the set C with coupling constraints replaced by Horn clauses, as in Def. 6.5. Then,
if C′ is satisfiable, C is satisfiable.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We now describe the algorithms we implement for solving Horn clauses, detail our implementation,
and evaluate our technique on well-known algorithms from the differential privacy literature.
7.1 Solving Horn clauses with Uninterpreted Functions
1: fun solve(C)
2: n ← 1
3: while true do
4: ρF ← synth(∃F .∧ Cn )
5: res ← verify(ρF C)
6: if res is sat then
7: return sat
8: n ← n + 1
Fig. 6. Algorithm for solving Horn
clauses with uninterpreted functions
Solving Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions is equiv-
alent to a program synthesis/verification problem, where we
have an incomplete program with holes and we want to fill
the holes to make the program satisfy some specification. In
our implementation we employ a counterexample-guided in-
ductive synthesis (cegis) [Solar-Lezama et al. 2006] technique
to propose a solution for the uninterpreted functions F , and
a fixed-point computation with predicate abstraction [Graf
and Saïdi 1997] to verify if the Horn clauses are satisfiable
for the candidate interpretation of F . Since these techniques
are relatively standard in the program synthesis literature, we
describe our solver at a high level in this section.
Synthesize–Verify Loop. Algorithm solve (Fig. 6) employs a synthesize–verify loop as follows:
Coupling Strategy Synthesis. In every iteration of the algorithm, the set of clauses C are un-
rolled into a set of clauses Cn , a standard technique in Horn-clause solving roughly corresponding
to unrolling program loops up to a finite bound—see, for example, the algorithm of McMillan
and Rybalchenko [2013]. We assume that there is a single clause Q ∈ C whose head is not a
relation application—we call it the query clause. The unrolling starts with clause Q , and creates
a fresh copy of every clause whose head is a relation that appears in the body of Q , and so on,
recursively, up to depth n. For an example, consider the following three clauses: r (x) −→ x > 0
and r (x) ∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r (x ′). If we unroll these clauses up to n = 3, we get the following
clauses: (i) r 3(x) −→ x > 0, (ii) r 2(x)∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r 3(x ′), and (iii) r 1(x)∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r 2(x ′),
where r i are fresh relation symbols (copies of r ).
Once we have non-recursive clauses Cn , we can construct a formula of the form
∃f1, . . . , fn . ∃r1, . . . , rm .
∧
C ∈Cn
C
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where fi and ri are the function and relation symbols appearing in the unrolled clauses. Since
Cn are non-recursive, we can rewrite them to remove the relation symbols. This is a standard
encoding in Horn clause solving that is analogous to encoding a loop-free program as a formula—
as in VC generation and bounded model checking—and we do not detail it here. We thus transform∧
C ∈Cn C into a constraint of the form ∃f1, . . . , fn . ∀x .φ which can be solved using program
synthesis algorithms (recall that variables are implicitly universally quantified). Specifically, for
synth, we employ a version of the symbolic synthesis algorithm due to Gulwani et al. [2011].
The synthesis phase generates an interpretation ρF of the function symbols, a winning coupling
strategy that proves ε-dp for adjacent inputs that terminate in n iterations.
Coupling Strategy Verification. This second phase verifies whether the synthesized strategy
is indeed a winning coupling strategy for all pairs of adjacent inputs by checking if ρFC is
satisfiable. That is, we plug in the synthesized values of F into C, resulting in a set of Horn
clauses with no uninterpreted functions—only invariant relation symbols invi—which can be
solved with a fixed-point computation. The result of verify could be sat, unsat, or unknown,
due to the undecidability of the problem. If the result is sat, then we know that ρF encodes a
winning coupling strategy and we are done. Otherwise, we try unrolling further.
While there are numerous Horn-clause solvers available, we have found that they are unable to
handle the clauses we encountered. We thus implemented a custom solver that uses predicate
abstraction. We detail our implementation and rationalize this decision below.
7.2 Implementation Details
We have implemented our approach by extending the FairSquare probabilistic verifier [Albarghouthi
et al. 2017]. Our implementation takes a program P in a simple probabilistic language with integers
and arrays over integers. An adjacency relation is provided as a first-order formula over input
program variables. The program P is then translated into a set of Horn clauses over the combined
theories of linear real/integer arithmetic, arrays, and uninterpreted functions.
Instantiations of the Synthesizer (synth). To find an interpretation of functions F , our synthe-
sis algorithm requires a grammar of expressions to search through. Constant functions can take any
integer value. In the case of Boolean and n-valued functions, we instantiate the synthesizer with a
grammar over Boolean operations, e.g.,  1 >  2 or  1 ,  2, where  1 and  2 can be replaced by
variables or numerical expressions over variables. In all of our benchmarks, we find that searching
for expressions with asts of depth 2 is sufficient to finding a winning coupling strategy.
Instantiations of Predicate Abstraction (verify). To compute invariants invi , we employ
predicate abstraction [Graf and Saïdi 1997]. In our initial experiments, we attempted to delegate this
process to existing Horn clause solvers. Unfortunately, they either diverged or could not handle the
theories we use.5 We thus built a Horn clause solver on top of the Z3 smt solver and instantiated it
with a large set of predicates Preds over a rich set of templates over pairs of variables. The templates
are of the form:  1 >  2,  1 =  2,  1 + k =  2, | 1 −  2 | ⩽ k . By instantiating  with program
variables and k with constants, we generate a large set of predicates. We also use the predicates
appearing in assume statements. To track the upper bound on ω, we use a class of predicates of
the form ω ⩽ ∑nj=1  j · iexpj that model every increment to the privacy cost, where iexpj is the
scale parameter in the jth sampling statement in the program (Lapiexpj (−) or Expiexpj (−)), and  j is
5Duality [McMillan and Rybalchenko 2013], which uses tree interpolants, diverged even on the simplest example. This is
due to the interpolation engine not being optimized for relational verification; for instance, in all examples we require
invariants containing multiple predicates of the form v1 = v2 or |v1 − v2 | ⩽ 1, where v1 and v2 are copies of the same
variable. SeaHorn [Gurfinkel et al. 2015], hsf [Grebenshchikov et al. 2012a], and Eldarica [Hojjat et al. 2012] have limited or
no support for arrays, and could not handle our benchmarks.
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fun SmartSum(q)
next, n, i, sum ← 0
r ← []
while i < |q | do
sum ← sum + q[i]
if (i + 1) %M = 0 then
n ∼ Lapε (n + sum)
sum, next ← 0, n
else
next ∼ Lapε (next + q[i])
r ← next :: r
i ← i + 1
return r
fun ExpMech(d, qscore)
i ← 1
bq ← 0
while i ⩽ R do
s ← qscore(i, d )
cq ← Expε/2(s)
if cq > bq ∨ i = 1 then
max ← i
bq ← cq
i ← i + 1
return max
fun NumericSparseN(qs, T , N )
r ← []
i, ct ← 0
t ∼ Lapε/3(T )
while i < |qs | ∧ ct < N do
n ∼ Lapε/6N (qs[i])
if n > t then
ans ∼ Lapε/3N (qs[i])
r ← (i, ans) :: r
ct ← ct + 1
i ← i + 1
return r
Fig. 7. Three representative benchmarks (in practice, lists are encoded as arrays)
instantiated as an expression of the cost of the chosen couplings for the jth statement, potentially
multiplied by a positive program variable if it occurs in a loop. For instance, if we have the shift
coupling, we instantiate  j with |k +z1 −z2 |; if we use the null coupling,  j is 0. We use all possible
combinations of  j and eliminate any non-linear predicates (see more below).
Since our invariants typically require disjunctions we employ boolean predicate abstraction, an
expensive procedure requiring exponentially many smt calls in the size of the predicates in the
worst case. To do so efficiently, we use the AllSMT algorithm of Lahiri et al. [2006], as implemented
in the MathSAT5 smt solver [Cimatti et al. 2013].
Handling Non-linearity. Observe that in the definition of shift couplings (Def. 3.6), the parameter
ε is multiplied by an expression, resulting in a non-linear constraint (a theory that is not well-
supported by smt solvers, due to its complexity). To eliminate non-linear constraints, we make the
key observation that it suffices to set ε to 1: Since all constraints involving ε are summations of
coefficients of ε , we only need to track the coefficients of ε .
Handling Conditionals. Winning coupling strategies (Thm. 4.7) assume synchronization at each
conditional statement. In our implementation, we only impose synchronization at loop heads by
encoding conditional code blocks (with no sampling statements) as monolithic instructions, as in
large-block encoding [Beyer et al. 2009]. This enables handling examples like Report Noisy Max
(§ 2), where the two processes may not enter the same branch of the conditional under the strategy.
7.3 Differentially Private Algorithms.
For evaluation, we automatically synthesized privacy proofs for a range of algorithms from the
differential privacy literature. The examples require a variety of different kinds of privacy proofs.
Simpler examples follow by composition, while more complex examples require more sophisticated
arguments. Fig. 7 shows the code for three of the more interesting algorithms, which we discuss
below; Table 2 presents the full collection of examples.
Two-Level Counter (SmartSum). The SmartSum algorithm [Chan et al. 2011; Dwork et al. 2010]
was designed to continually publish aggregate statistics while maintaining privacy—for example,
continually releasing the total number of visitors to a website. Suppose that we have a list of inputs
q, where q[i] denotes the total number of visitors in hour i . SmartSum releases a list of all running
sums: q[0], q[0] + q[1], . . . ,∑ij=0 q[j], . . .. Rather than adding separate noise to each q[i] or adding
separate noise to each running sum—which would provide weak privacy guarantees or inaccurate
results—SmartSum chunks the inputs into blocks of sizeM and adds noise to the sum of each block.
Then, each noisy running sum can be computed by summing several noised blocks and additional
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noise for the remaining inputs. By choosing the block size carefully, this approach releases all
running sums with less noise than more naïve approaches, while ensuring ε-dp.
Discrete Exponential Mechanism (ExpMech). The exponential mechanism [McSherry and
Talwar 2007] is used when (i) the output of an algorithm is non-numeric or (ii) different outputs
have different utility, and adding numeric noise to the output would produce an unusable answer,
e.g., in the case of an auction where we want to protect privacy of bidders [Dwork and Roth
2014]. ExpMech takes a database and a quality score (utility function) as input, where the quality
score maps the database and each element of the range to a numeric score. Then, the algorithm
releases the element with approximately the highest score. We verified a version of this algorithm
that adds noise drawn from the exponential mechanism to each quality score, and then releases
the element with the highest noisy score. This implementation is also called the one-sided Noisy
Arg-Max [Dwork and Roth 2014].
Sparse Vector Mechanism (NumericSparseN). The Sparse Vector mechanism (also called
NumericSparse in the textbook by Dwork and Roth [2014]) is used in scenarios where we would
like to answer a large number of numeric queries while only paying for queries with large answers.
To achieve ε-dp, NumericSparseN releases the noised values of the first N queries that are above
some known threshold T , while only reporting that other queries are below the threshold, without
disclosing their values.
Specifically, NumericSparseN takes a list of numeric queries qs and numeric threshold T . Each
query is assumed to be 1-sensitive—its answer may differ by at most 1 on adjacent databases. The
thresholdT is assumed to be public knowledge, so we can model it as being equal in adjacent inputs.
The Sparse Vector mechanism adds noise to the threshold and then computes a noisy answer for
each query. When the algorithm finds a query where the noisy answer is larger than the noisy
threshold, it records the index of the query. It also adds fresh noise to the query answer, and records
the (freshly) noised answer as well. When the algorithm records N queries or runs out of queries,
it returns the final list of indices and answers.
The privacy proof is interesting for two reasons. First, applying the composition theorem of
privacy does prove privacy, but with an overly conservative level of ε that depends on the number
of queries. A more careful proof by coupling shows that the privacy level depends only on the
number of above threshold queries, potentially a large saving if most of the queries are below
threshold. Second, adding fresh noise when estimating the answer of above threshold queries is
critical for privacy—it is not private to reuse the noisy answer of the query from checking against
the noisy threshold. Previous versions of this algorithm suffered from this flaw [Lyu et al. 2017].
7.4 Experimental Results
Table 3 summarizes the results of applying our implementation to the differentially private algo-
rithms described in Table 2. For each algorithm, we established ε-dp; in case of SmartSum, we show
that it is 2ε-dp, as established by Chan et al. [2011].6 In all our examples, we transform coupling
constraints (using Def. 6.5) by instantiating strate (for every sampling sampling statement ste ) with
two choices, the null and shift coupling families of Lap or Exp—i.e., the function f (v) in Def. 6.5 has
range {1, 2}. While this is sufficient to find a proof for all examples, in the case of the Sparse Vector
mechanism (NumericSparse*), we found that the proof requires an invariant that lies outside our
decidable theory. Using the choice coupling family for those algorithms, our tool can automatically
discover a much simpler invariant.
Results Overview. For each algorithm, Table 3 shows the privacy bound and the number of sam-
pling statements (#Samples) appearing in the algorithm to give a rough idea of how many couplings
6Technically, this requires changing the upper bound on ω from ε to 2ε in the clause generated by rule dpriv in Fig. 4.
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Table 2. Differentially private algorithms used in our evaluation
Algorithm Description
PartialSum Compute the noisy sum of a list of queries.
PrefixSum Compute the noisy sum for every prefix of a list of queries.
SmartSum Advanced version of PrefixSum that chunks the list [Chan et al. 2011; Dwork et al. 2010].
ReportNoisyMax Find the element with the highest quality score [Dwork and Roth 2014].
ExpMech Variant of ReportNoisyMax using the exponential distribution [Dwork and Roth 2014;
McSherry and Talwar 2007].
AboveThreshold Find the index of the first query above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014].
AboveThresholdN Find the indices of the first N queries with answer above threshold [Dwork and Roth
2014; Lyu et al. 2017].
NumericSparse Return the index and answer of the first query above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014].
NumericSparseN Return the indices and answers of the first N queries above threshold [Dwork and Roth
2014; Lyu et al. 2017].
must be found. The verification statistics show the number of predicates (#Preds) generated from
our predicate templates, and the time spent in verify. The synthesis statistics show the size (in
terms of ast nodes) of the largest formula passed to synth and number of variables appearing in
it; the number of cegis iterations of the synthesis algorithm [Gulwani et al. 2011]; and the time
spent in synth.
In all cases, our implementation was able to automatically establish differential privacy in a
matter of minutes. However, there is significant variation in the time needed for different algorithms.
Consider, for instance, NumericSparseN. While it is a more general version of AboveThresholdN,
it requires less verification time. This is because the invariant required by NumericSparseN is con-
junctive, allowing verify to quickly discover an invariant. The invariant required byAboveThresh-
oldN contains multiple disjuncts, making it spend more time in boolean abstraction. (Note that an
upper bound on the number of possible disjunctive invariants using n predicates is 22n .) Synthesis
time, however, is higher for NumericSparseN. This is due to the use of the choice coupling family,
which has two coupling parameters and requires discovering a non-overlapping predicate P .
Detailed Discussion. For a more detailed view, let us consider the ReportNoisyMax algorithm.
In § 2, we described in detail the winning coupling strategy our tool discovers. To verify that the
coupling strategy is indeed winning, the example requires the following coupled invariant:
I ≜ (i1 = i2) ∧ (i1 ⩽ ι =⇒ I⩽ ∧ ω ⩽ 0) ∧ (i1 > ι =⇒ I> ∧ ω ⩽ ε),
where
I⩽ ≜ ((r1 = r2 = ι = 0) ∨ (r1 < ι ∧ r2 < ι)) ∧ |best1 − best2 | ⩽ 1
I> ≜ r1 = ι =⇒ (r2 = ι ∧ best1 + 1 = best2).
At a high-level, the invariant considers two cases: (i) when the loop counter i1 is less than or equal
to the output ι, and (ii) when the loop counter i1 has moved past the output ι. In the latter case,
the invariant ensures that if r1 = ι, then r2 = ι, and, crucially, best1 + 1 = best2. Notice also how
the invariant establishes that the privacy cost is upper-bounded by ε . Our tool discovers a similar
invariant for ExpMech, with the strategy also establishing the precondition of the shift coupling.
Let us now consider a more complex example, the NumericSparseVectorN, which utilizes the
choice coupling. Notice that there are 3 sampling statements in this example.
• For the first sampling statement, we use the shift coupling to ensure that t1 + 1 = t2; since
T1 = T2, we incur a privacy cost of ε/3.
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Table 3. Experimental results (OS X 10.11; 4GHz Intel Core i7; 16GB RAM)
Verification stats. Synthesis stats.
Algorithm Bound #Samples #Preds Time (s) #vars Formula size #cegis iters. Time (s)
PartialSum ε 1 30 12 183 566 9 0.4
PrefixSum ε 1 40 14 452 1246 8 1.1
SmartSum 2ε 2 44 255 764 2230 1766 579.2
ReportNoisyMax ε 1 36 22 327 1058 35 1.5
ExpMech ε 1 36 22 392 1200 152 5.0
AboveThreshold ε 2 37 27 437 1245 230 7.3
AboveThresholdN ε 3 59 580 692 1914 628 31.3
NumericSparse ε 2 62 4 480 1446 65 3.2
NumericSparseN ε 3 68 5 663 1958 6353 1378.9
• For the second sampling statement, we use the choice coupling: When n1 > t1, we use the
shift coupling to ensure that n1 + 1 = n2; otherwise, we take the null coupling. Since qs1[i1]
and qs2[i2] may differ by one, as per the adjacency relation, we will incur a worst-case price
of ε/3 for this statement, since we will incur 2 ∗ ε/6N cost for each of the N iterations where
n1 > t1.
• Finally, for the third sampling statement, use the shift coupling to ensure that ans1 = ans2,
incurring a cost of ε/3 across the N iterations where the conditional is entered.
As such, this strategy establishes that the NumericSparseVecN is ε = ε/3 + ε/3 + ε/3 differentially
private. It is easy to see that this is a winning coupling strategy, since whenever the first process
enters the conditional and updates r , the second process also enters the conditional and updates r
with the same value—as the strategy ensures that ans1 = ans2 and i1 = i2.
Summary. Our results demonstrate that our proof technique based on winning coupling strategies
is (i) amenable to automation through Horn-clause solving, and (ii) is applicable to non-trivial
algorithms proposed in the differential privacy literature. To the best of our knowledge, our
technique is the first to automatically establish privacy for all of the algorithms in Table 3.
8 RELATEDWORK
Formal Verification of Differential Privacy. Researchers have explored a broad array of tech-
niques for static verification of differential privacy, including linear and dependent type sys-
tems [Azevedo de Amorim et al. 2014, 2017; Barthe et al. 2015; Gaboardi et al. 2013; Reed and Pierce
2010; Zhang and Kifer 2017], relational program logics [Barthe et al. 2017b, 2016a,b, 2013; Barthe
and Olmedo 2013; Hsu 2017; Olmedo 2014; Sato 2016], partial evaluation [Winograd-Cort et al.
2017], and more. Barthe et al. [2016c] provide a recent survey.
Our work is inspired by the LightDP system [Zhang and Kifer 2017], which combines a relational
type system for an imperative language, a novel type-inference algorithm, and a product program
construction. Types in the relational type system encode randomness alignments. Numeric types
have the form numd, where d is a distance expression that can mention program variables. Roughly
speaking, the distance d describes how to map samples x from the first execution to samples
x + |d| in the second execution. Zhang and Kifer [2017] focus on randomness alignments that are
injective maps from samples to samples. Such maps also give rise to approximate couplings; for
instance, if д : Z→ Z is injective, then there exists a variable approximate coupling of two Laplace
distributions Λ = {(z,д(z), c(z))} for some costs c(z). However, approximate couplings are more
general than randomness alignments, as couplings do not require an injective map on samples.
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Zhang and Kifer [2017] also show how distance expressions (and hence randomness alignments)
in LightDP can be combined: they can be added and subtracted (d1 ⊕ d2), multiplied and divided
(d1⊗d2), and formed into conditional expressions (d1⊙d2 ? d3 : d4, where ⊙ is a binary comparison).
This last conditional construction is highly useful for proving privacy of certain examples, and
is modeled by the choice coupling in our system (§ 6). Conceptually, our work gives a better
understanding of randomness alignment and approximate couplings—in some sense, randomness
alignments can be seen as a particular case of (variable) approximate couplings. LightDP also uses
MaxSMT to find an optimal privacy guarantee. Our approach is property-directed: we try to prove a
set upper-bound. We could enrich the generated constraints with an objective function minimizing
the privacy cost ω, and solve them using an optimal synthesis technique [Bornholt et al. 2016].
We also draw on ideas from Barthe et al. [2014], who, like Zhang and Kifer [2017], use a product
construction for proving differential privacy. Each call to a sampling instruction is replaced by a call
to a non-deterministic function, incrementing the cost in a ghost variablevε . However, their system
cannot prove privacy beyond composition, and the cost is required to be deterministic. In particular,
many of the advanced examples that we consider, like Report Noisy Max and the Sparse Vector
mechanisms, are not verifiable. Our work can be seen as extending their system along three axes:
(i) supporting richer couplings for the sampling instructions to handle more complex examples,
(ii) reasoning about randomized privacy costs, and (iii) automatically constructing the proof.
Automated Verification and Synthesis. We reduced the problem of verifying ε-dp to solving
Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions. Beyene et al. [2013] introduced existentially quan-
tified Horn clauses, which were used for infinite-state ctl verification and solving ω-regular
games [Beyene et al. 2014]. There, variables in the head of a clause can be existentially quantified.
To solve the clauses, they Skolemize the existential variables and discover a solution to a Skolem
relation. Using this technique, we could have adopted an alternative encoding by using existentially
quantified variables to stand for unknown couplings in strategies. However, for correctness, we
would need to restrict solutions for Skolem relations to be couplings—e.g., by enforcing a template
for the Skolem relations.
Solving Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions is closely connected to sketching-based
program synthesis problems [Solar-Lezama et al. 2006], where we want to find substitutions
for holes in a program to ensure that the whole program satisfies a target property. One could
reformulate our problem of solving Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions as solving a program
synthesis problem, and, e.g., use the template-based technique of Srivastava et al. [2010] to find
an inductive invariant and a coupling strategy. In our implementation, we used a synthesize-
and-verify loop, a methodology that has appeared in different guises, for example, in the Sketch
synthesizer [Solar-Lezama et al. 2006] and the e-hsf Horn-clause solver [Beyene et al. 2013].
Hyperproperties. There is a rich body of work on verifying relational/hyper- properties of pro-
grams, e.g., in translation-validation [Necula 2000; Pnueli et al. 1998], security problems [Clarkson
and Schneider 2010; Terauchi and Aiken 2005], and Java code [Sousa and Dillig 2016]. There has
been far less work on automated reasoning for probabilistic relational properties. Techniques
for reasoning about quantitative information flow [Köpf and Rybalchenko 2010] typically reason
about probabilities, since the property depends on a distribution on inputs. However, since there
are no universally quantified variables in the property, the verification problem can be handled
by model-counting: counting the number of executions that satisfy certain properties. The ε-dp
property quantifies over all sets of adjacent inputs and all outputs, making automated verification
significantly more challenging.
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have presented a novel proof technique for ε-differential privacy, by finding a strategy that uses
variable approximate couplings to pair two adjacent executions of a program. We formulated the
set of winning strategies in a novel constraint system using Horn clauses and coupling constraints.
By carefully restricting solutions of coupling constraints to encodings of coupling families, we can
automatically prove correctness of complex algorithms from the differential privacy literature.
The next natural step would be to automate proofs of (ε,δ )-differential privacy. Approximate
couplings have been used in the past to verify this more subtle version of privacy, but there are
both conceptual and practical challenges in automatically finding these proofs. On the theoretical
end, while we proved ε-DP by finding a coupling strategy with cost ε for each output, if we find a
coupling strategy with cost (ε,δ ) for each output, then δ parameters will sum up over all outputs to
give the privacy level for all outputs—this can lead to a very weak guarantee, or a useless guarantee
if there are infinitely many outputs. On the more practical side, in many cases the δ parameter in
an (ε,δ )-private algorithm arises from an accuracy bound stating that a certain key sample has a
small, δ probability of being too large. These bounds often have a complex form, involving division
and logarithm operations. Due to these and other obstacles, to date there is no automatic system
for proving (ε,δ )-privacy. Nevertheless, extending our techniques to find such proofs would be an
intriguing direction for future work.
There are other possible targets of our approach beyond differential privacy. For example, we plan
to adapt our technique to synthesize independence and uniformity for properties of probabilistic
programs [Barthe et al. 2017a]. Additionally, we plan to combine our techniques with probabilistic
resource bounds analyses to synthesize couplings that provide upper bounds on distances between
probabilistic processes, e.g., to show rapid mixing of Markov chains [Barthe et al. 2017c].
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A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proofs for variable approximate couplings
The following proves Lem. 3.5, which connects variable approximate couplings with ε-dp.
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Proof. This is a standard lemma about approximate couplings; see, e.g. Barthe et al. [2016b,
Proposition 6].We provide a self-contained proof here. Let j be any element ofDvr and let (s1, s2) ∈ ∆
be two adjacent inputs. We have two witness distributions µL, µR to the approximate couplingJPK(s1)↭Λj JPK(s2). Therefore, we can boundJPK(s1)({s ′1 | s ′1(vr ) = j}) = µL({(s ′1, s ′2) | s ′1(vr ) = j}) (First marginal)
⩽ exp(ε) · µR ({(s ′1, s ′2) | s ′1(vr ) = j}) (Distance)
⩽ exp(ε) · µR ({(s ′1, s ′2) | s ′2(vr ) = j}) (Support)
⩽ exp(ε) · JPK(s2)({s ′2 | s ′2(vr ) = j}). (Second marginal)
We use ε for s1(ε).
■
A.2 Proofs for coupling strategies
Lem. 4.6 is the key technical result connecting coupling strategies to couplings. To build the witness,
we will need a few standard distribution operations.
Definition A.1. Let B,B′ be discrete sets.
• The zero sub-distribution dzero : dist↓(B) assigns weight 0 to all elements.
• The unit map dunit : B → dist↓(B) is defined by dunit(a)(a′) ≜ 1[a = a′].
• The bind map dbind : dist↓(B) × (B → dist↓(B′)) → dist↓(B′) is defined by:
dbind(µ, f )(a′) ≜
∑
a∈B
µ(a) · f (a)(a′).
■
We will use the following lemma about bind and projections.
Lemma A.2. Suppose we have functions f : B → dist↓(B′) and д : B′ → dist↓(B′′). Let Φ ⊆
B × B,Φ′ ⊆ B′ × B′,Φ′′ ⊆ B′′ × B′′ be binary relations. Let i = 1 or 2. Suppose that we have maps
F : B × B → dist↓(B′ × B′) and G : B′ × B′ → dist↓(B′′ × B′′) such that
• πi (F (a1,a2)) = f (πi (a1,a2)) and supp(F (a1,a2)) ⊆ Φ′ for every (a1,a2) ∈ Φ; and
• πi (G(a′1,a′2)) = д(πi (a′1,a′2)) and supp(G(a′1,a′2)) ⊆ Φ′′ for every (a′1,a′2) ∈ Φ′.
Then for every (a1,a2) ∈ Φ, we have
• πi (dbind(F (a1,a2),G)) = dbind(f (πi (a1,a2)),д) and supp(dbind(F (a1,a2),G)) ⊆ Φ′′ .
Proof. By unfolding definitions. ■
We can now prove Lem. 4.6.
Lemma A.3 (From strategies to couplings (Lem. 4.6)). Suppose τ is synchronizing for σ and
(s0, s ′0) ∈ ∆. Let Ψ = postτ ({(s0, s ′0, 0)},σ ), and let f : S × S → R be such that c ⩽ f (s, s ′) for all
(s, s ′, c) ∈ Ψ. Then we have a coupling
σ (s0)↭Ψf σ (s ′0)
with Ψf ≜ {(s, s ′, f (s, s ′)) | (s, s ′,−) ∈ Ψ}.
Proof. We will construct witnesses µL, µR for the desired coupling by induction on the length of
σ . In the base case σ is the empty command and the claim is straightforward: µL = µR ≜ dunit(s0, s ′0)
witness the approximate coupling with cost f = 0.
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In the inductive case, σ = σ ′; st for a command st. Let Ψ ≜ postτ ({(s0, s ′0, 0)},σ ) be the coupled
post-condition for the whole trace, and let Θ ≜ postτ ({(s0, s ′0, 0)},σ ) be the coupled postcondition
for the prefix. We will write dom(Ψ) and dom(Θ) for the coupled postconditions projected to the
first two components.
If the final statement st is an assignment x ← exp, define a cost function f : S × S → R by
f (si , s ′i ) ≜ f (si [x 7→ si (exp)], s ′i [x 7→ s ′i (exp)]).
By definition of Ψ, we must have c ⩽ f (si , s ′i ) for every (si , s ′i , c) ∈ Θ. Hence by induction, we have
an approximate coupling Jσ ′Ks0 ↭Ψf Jσ ′Ks ′0
where Ψf ≜ {(s, s ′, f (s, s ′)) | (s, s ′) ∈ dom(Θ)}. So every pair of inputs (s0, s ′0) ∈ ∆ gives a pair of
witness distributions µ ′L, µ
′
R , in particular they satisfy the marginal and support conditions.
Now take any two states (si , s ′i ) ∈ dom(Θ) and define
wL(si , s ′i ) = wR (si , s ′i ) ≜ dunit(si [x 7→ si (e)], s ′i [x 7→ s ′i (e)]).
Lem. A.2 shows that µL ≜ dbind(µ ′L,wL) and µR ≜ dbind(µ ′R ,wR ) have support in dom(Ψ) and
have marginals π1(µL) = Jσ ;x ← expKs0 and π2(µR ) = Jσ ;x ← expKs ′0. It only remains to check the
distance conditions. By the distance condition on µ ′L, µ
′
R , and definition of f , we have
µL(s, s ′) = µ ′L({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(dom(Θ)) | (s, s ′) = Jx ← expK(t , t ′)})
⩽
∑
(t,t ′)∈dom(Θ):(s,s ′)=Jx←expK(t,t ′) exp(f (t , t
′)) · µ ′R (t , t ′)
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µ ′R ({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | (s, s ′) = Jx ← expK(t , t ′)})
⩽ exp(f (s, s ′)) · µ ′R ({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | (s, s ′) = Jx ← expK(t , t ′)})
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µR (s, s ′).
Hence µL, µR are witnesses to the desired approximate couplingJσ ′;x ← expKs0 ↭Ψf Jσ ′;x ← expKs ′0.
If the final statement st is an assume assume(bexp), we know that dom(Θ) ⊆ {(s, s ′) | s(bexp) =
s ′(bexp)} since τ is a synchronizing strategy. Define a cost function f by
f (si , s ′i ) =
{
f (si , s ′i ) : si (bexp) ∧ s ′i (bexp)
0 : otherwise.
We have c ⩽ f (si , s ′i ) for every (si , s ′i , c) ∈ Θ, by definition. By induction, we have an approximate
coupling Jσ ′Ks0 ↭Ψf Jσ ′Ks ′0.
So every pair of inputs (s0, s ′0) ∈ ∆ gives a pair of witness distributions µ ′L, µ ′R . Now take any two
states (si , s ′i ) ∈ dom(Θ) and define
wL(si , s ′i ) =
{
dunit(si , s ′i ) : si (bexp)
dzero : otherwise
and wR (si , s ′i ) =
{
dunit(si , s ′i ) : s ′i (bexp)
dzero : otherwise.
Lem. A.2 shows that µL ≜ dbind(µ ′L,wL) and µR ≜ dbind(µ ′R ,wR ) have support in dom(Ψ) and
have marginals π1(µL) = Jσ ′; assume(bexp)Ks0 and π2(µR ) = Jσ ′; assume(bexp)Ks ′0. We just need to
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check the distance condition. By the distance condition on µ ′L, µ
′
R , we have
µL(s, s ′) = µ ′L({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | t(bexp)})
= µ ′L({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | t(bexp) ∧ t ′(bexp)})
⩽
∑
(t,t ′)∈dom(Θ):t (bexp)∧t ′(bexp)
exp(f (t , t ′)) · µ ′R (t , t ′)
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µ ′R ({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | t(bexp) ∧ t ′(bexp)})
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µ ′R ({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | t ′(bexp)})
⩽ exp(f (s, s ′)) · µ ′R ({(t , t ′) ∈ dom(Θ) | t ′(bexp)})
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µR (s, s ′).
Hence, µL, µR are witnesses to the desired approximate coupling:Jσ ′; assume(bexp)Ks0 ↭Ψf Jσ ′; assume(bexp)Ks ′0.
If the final statement st is a sampling x ∼ dexp, suppose that τ selects a coupling Λ ⊆ Z ×Z ×R
for the distributions. So for every pair of states (s, s ′) we have
s(dexp)↭Λ s ′(dexp).
Note that Λ can depend on the states (s, s ′); we will write Λ[s, s ′] to emphasize this. Define a cost
function f by
f (si , s ′i ) ≜ inf{ f (si [x 7→ a], si [x 7→ a′]) − c | (a,a′, c) ∈ Λ[si , s ′i ]}
for every (si , s ′i ) ∈ dom(Θ), and 0 otherwise. To give a coupling for the sampling command, we first
extend the coupling Λ[s, s ′] to whole memories by defining
Λ[s, s ′] ≜ {(s[x 7→ a], s ′[x 7→ a′], c) | (a,a′, c) ∈ Λ}
We then define a cost function д representing the cost of the coupling: for every (si , s ′i ) ∈ dom(Θ)
define
д(si [x 7→ a], s ′i [x 7→ a′]) ≜ sup{c | (a,a′, c) ∈ Λ[si , s ′i ]}
for every (a,a′, c) ∈ Λ[si , s ′i ], and 0 otherwise. Note that д has a dependence on (si , s ′i ); we will
sometimes write д[si , s ′i ] for clarity. Note also that the supremum on the right is at most f (si [x 7→
a], s ′i [x 7→ a′]) < ∞. By the semantics of the sampling command, we have a couplingJx ∼ dexpKsi ↭Λд Jx ∼ dexpKs ′i .
for every (si , s ′i ) ∈ dom(Θ).
Additionally, c ⩽ f (si , s ′i ) for every (si , s ′i , c) ∈ Θ by definition. Hence by induction, we have an
approximate coupling Jσ ′Ks0 ↭Θf Jσ ′Ks ′0.
So every pair of inputs (s0, s ′0) ∈ ∆ gives a pair of witness distributions µ ′L, µ ′R , in particular they
satisfy the marginal and support conditions.
By the definition, Θ contains all pairs of coupled states reachable from (s0, s ′0) after running σ ′,
and Ψ contains all pairs of coupled states reachable after running σ ′;x ∼ dexp. Hence by definition
of postτ , we must have dom(Λ[si , s ′i ]) ⊆ dom(Ψ) for every (si , s ′i ) ∈ Θ and so:Jx ∼ dexpKsi ↭Ψд Jx ∼ dexpKs ′i .
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LetwL(si , s ′i ),wR (si , s ′i ) be the left and the right witnesses, respectively. Lem. A.2 shows that µL ≜
dbind(µ ′L,wL) and µR ≜ dbind(µ ′R ,wR ) have support in dom(Ψ) and have the correct marginals
π1(µL) = Jσ ′;x ∼ dexpKs0 and π2(µR ) = Jσ ′;x ∼ dexpKs ′0.
It only remains to check the distance conditions, and it is enough to check for final states
(s, s ′) ∈ Ψ—otherwise by the support condition, µL(s, s ′) = 0 and the distance condition is clear. By
the distance condition on µ ′L, µ
′
R , we have:
µL(s, s ′) =
∑
(si ,s ′i )∈dom(Θ)
µ ′L(si , s ′i ) ·wL(si , s ′i )(s, s ′)
⩽
∑
(si ,s ′i )∈dom(Θ)
exp(f (si , s ′i ) + д[si , s ′i ](s, s ′)) · µ ′R (si , s ′i ) ·wR (si , s ′i )(s, s ′)
⩽
∑
(si ,s ′i )∈dom(Θ)
exp(f (s, s ′) − д[si , s ′i ](s, s ′) + д[si , s ′i ](s, s ′)) · µ ′R (si , s ′i ) ·wR (si , s ′i )(s, s ′)
⩽ exp(f (s, s ′))
∑
(si ,s ′i )∈dom(Θ)
µ ′R (si , s ′i ) ·wR (si , s ′i )(s, s ′)
= exp(f (s, s ′)) · µR (s, s ′).
The second inequality holds because we may assume that (s, s ′) are of the form (si [x 7→ a], s ′i [x 7→
a′]) with (a,a′) ∈ Λ[si , s ′i ]; if not,wR (si , s ′i )(s, s ′) = 0 by the support condition on witnesses. Hence,
we have the claimed approximate coupling:Jσ ′;x ∼ dexpKs0 ↭Ψf Jσ ′;x ∼ dexpKs ′0.
This completes the inductive step, and the proof. ■
A.3 Proofs for HMC encoding
First, we define how we interpret a solution ρ |= C as a strategy {τj }j . For every pair of states
(s1, s2) ∈ S × S , every sampling statement ste , and every j ∈ Dvr , we define τj as:
τj (ste , s1, s2) = ρ(strate (c,−,−,−))
where c assigns each variable vi inv the value si (v), and assigns ι to j. By semantics of coupling
constraints, any solution ρ |= C results in a coupling strategy using the above construction
Lemma A.4 (Soundness of coupled invariants). Fix P and ∆. Let C be the generated Horn
clauses. Let ρ |= C. Let {τj }j be the coupling strategy in ρ, as defined above. For every location i in P ,
every trace σ from ℓen to i , every j ∈ Dvr , and every (s1, s2,d) ∈ postτj (∆ × {0},σ ), we have that the
following formula is valid(
ω = d ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1(v) = v1 ∧ s2(v) = v2
)
⇒ ρ(invi (v,ω))
Proof. We proceed by induction on length n of σ .
Base case: For n = 0 (empty trace), the constraint above holds trivially by rule init.
For n = 1, we consider 3 different cases, one for each statement type.
Assume σ is an assignment statement v ← exp, then we know that (s1, s2,d) ∈ ∆ × {0} iff
(s1[v 7→ s1(exp)], s2[v 7→ s2(exp)],d) ∈ post(∆ × {0},σ ). By definition of assign, we know that the
following is valid:
ρ(invℓen (v,ω)) ∧v ′1 = exp1 ∧v ′2 = exp2 −→ ρ(invi (v[v],ω))
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By base case n = 0, we know that the following is valid:(
ω = d ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1(v) = v1 ∧ s2(v) = v2
)
⇒ ρ(invℓen (v,ω))
Therefore,(
ω = d ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1[v 7→ s1(exp)](v) = v1 ∧ s2[v 7→ s2(exp)](v) = v2
)
⇒ ρ(invi (v,ω))
Now, assume σ is assume(bexp). By definition of post, for every (s1, s2,d) ∈ ∆ × {0}, (s1, s2,d) ∈
post(∆ × {0}, assume(bexp)) iff s1(bexp) = s2(bexp) = true. By n = 0 and the definition of rule
assume, we have that the following is valid:(
ω = d ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1(v) = v1 ∧ s2(v) = v2
)
∧ bexp1 ∧ bexp2 ⇒ ρ(invi (v,ω))
Therefore, if (s1, s2,d) is such that s1(bexp) = s2(bexp) = true, then the left hand side of the above
formula is satisfied.
Now, assume σ is v ∼ dexp. By definition of post, we know that for every (s1, s2,d) ∈ ∆ × 0, and
every (c1, c2,d ′) ∈ τj (v ∼ dexp, s1, s2), we have (s1[v 7→ c1], s2[v 7→ c2],d + d ′) ∈ post(∆ × 0,σ ).
By definition of τj using ρ (as defined above) and the definition of rule strat, we have that the
following holds:(
ω = d + d ′ ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1[v 7→ c1](v) = v1 ∧ s2[v 7→ c2](v) = v2
)
⇒ ρ(invi (v,ω))
Inductive step: Assuming the lemma holds for n > 1, then establishing that it holds for n + 1
follows an analogous case split by statement as for the base case. ■
We can now easily prove Thm. 5.7.
Proof. Fix P and ∆. Let C be the generated Horn clauses. Let ρ |= C. Let {τj }j be the coupling
strategy in ρ(strate ), for every e where ste is a sampling statement. For every maximal trace σ ,
every j ∈ Dvr , and every (s1, s2,d) ∈ postτj (∆ × {0},σ ), we know from Lem. A.4 that(
ω = d ∧ ι = j ∧
∧
v ∈V
s1(v) = v1 ∧ s2(v) = v2
)
⇒ ρ(invℓret (v,ω))
We also know by rule dpriv that ρ(invℓret (v,ω)) −→ ω ⩽ ε ∧ (vr1 = ι ⇒ vr2 = ι) is valid. Therefore,
d ⩽ ε and, if s1(vr ) = j, then s2(vr ) = j.
This establishes ε-dp, assuming {τj }j are synchronizing. We now show that strategy is syn-
chronizing. Fix some statement assume(bexp) on edge (i, j). By rule assume-s, we have that the
following is valid: ρ(invi (v,ω)) → bexp1 ≡ bexp2. Therefore, following Lem. A.4, for any trace σ
from ℓen to i , every j and every (s1, s2,d) ∈ postτj (∆ × {0},σ ), we have s1(bexp) = s2(bexp). ■
We now prove correctness of Thm. 6.7, which states correctness of transforming coupling
constraints into clauses.
Proof. Fix a coupling constraint in C:
M(v1)↭r (v3,−,−,−) M(v2)
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Let ρ |= C′. Suppose that ρ does not satisfy the coupling constraint. Then, there is a value of c1,2,3
ofv1,2,3 such that ρ(r (c3,−,−,−)) is not a coupling for distributionsM(c1) andM(c2).
By Def. 6.5, we know that ρ(r (v,d1,d2,θ )) is a formula of the form(
n∧
i=1
f (v) = i =⇒ enc(Λi [v1,v2])
)
Then, for some i ∈ [1,n], the relation over (d1,d2,θ ) denoted by the formula Λ[c1,c2] is (i) not a
coupling forM(c1) andM(c2), or (ii) preΛi [c1,c2] does not hold. To show that neither case is true,
we prove correctness of enc in Fig. 5. We consider the following cases of Λi :
• Null Λ∅[z1, z2]: For every instantiation c1, c2 of z1, z2, we have the formula d1−c1 = d2−c2∧
θ = 0 whose satisfying assignments are the ternary relation {(d1,d2, 0) | d1,d2 ∈ Z,d1 − c1 =
d2 − c2}, recovering the definition of a null coupling.
• Shift (Lap)Λ+k [z1, z2]: For every instantiation c1, c2 of z1, z2, we have the formulad1+ρ(fk ) =
d2 ∧ θ = |c1 − c2 + ρ(fk )|ε , where ρ(fk ) is an integer. The satisfying assignments of this
formula are
{(d1,d2, |c1 − c2 + ρ(fk )|ε) | d1 + ρ(fk ) = d2,d1,d2 ∈ Z}
This recovers the definition of a shift coupling for Lap.
• Shift (Exp) Λ′
+k [z1, z2]: For every instantiation c1, c2 of z1, z2 such that c2 − c1 ⩽ ρ(fk ), we
have a similar argument as above for Lap. By the precondition constraint specified in Def. 6.5,
we know that if f (v) = i , then z2 − z1 ⩽ k .
• Choice (Π ? Λ+k [z1, z2] : Λ∅[z1, z2]): For every instantiation c1, c2 of z1, z2, we have the
formula ∧{ ρ(Π(d1) ⇒ (d1 − c1 = d2 − c2 ∧ θ = 0)
¬ρ(Π(d1)) ⇒ (d1 + ρ(fk ) = d2 ∧ θ = |c1 − c2 + ρ(fk )|ε)
which according to our cases above, and Lem. 6.2, is a coupling assuming the non-overlapping
condition. By the precondition constraint specified in Def. 6.5, we know that if f (v) = i , then
for every d1,d2,d ′1,d ′2, the following formula holds:∧{ ρ(Π(d1)) ⇒ d1 + ρ(fk ) = d2 ∧ θ = |c1 − c2 + ρ(fk )|ε
¬ρ(Π(d ′1)) ⇒ d ′1 − c1 = d ′2 − c2 ∧ θ ′ = 0
}
=⇒ d ′2 , d2
The first conjunct encodes the shift coupling (as shown above) and the second conjunct the
null coupling (also shown above).
This implies the non-overlapping condition: for a1 ∈ Π, a′1 < Π, every (a1,a2,−) ∈ Λ+k [c1, c2]
and every (a′1,a′2,−) ∈ Λ+k [c1, c2], we have a2 , a′2. ■
B IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
B.1 Dealing with non-linearity
In § 7, we noted that our tool employs an optimization wherein it fixes the parameter ε to 1, and
that suffices to show differential privacy for all ε > 0. We now formally show correctness of this
optimization.
Our optimization hinges on three observations: (i) In all algorithms in the literature, ε only
appears in the form iexp · ε in sampling statements, e.g., Lapiexp ·ε (·) or Expiexp ·ε (·). Here, iexp > 0 is
assumed to be a positive expression over input program variables. (ii) In all couplings we utilize,
the cost is a multiple of iexp · ε . (iii) The choice of a coupling family and its parameters in our
coupling strategies does not depend on the value of ε . Therefore, for any coupled execution from
a pair of adjacent states, and for any ε , the final cost is of the form
∑n
i=1 ciε , where there are n
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sampling statements encountered in the coupled execution and ci ∈ R⩾0. Since our goal is to show
that
∑n
i=1 ciε ⩽ ε , it suffices to check that
∑n
i=1 ci ⩽ 1.
The following Lemma formalizes the our observations, under the assumptions stated above.
Lemma B.1. Fix program P and adjacency relation ∆. Let σ be a maximal trace through P and τ be
coupling strategy for P . Let Qc = postτ (∆c × {0},σ ), for ∆c is ∆ with ε fixed to c ∈ R⩾0 in all pairs
of states. Then,
(1) for all c > 0, (s1, s2,−) ∈ Qc iff (s1, s2,−) ∈ Q1;
(2) for all c > 0, if (s1, s2,d) ∈ Qc , then (s1, s2,d/c) ∈ Q1; and
(3) for all c > 0, if (s1, s2,d) ∈ Q1, then (s1, s2,d · c) ∈ Qc .
Point 1 states how states are paired does not change by changing ε . Points 2 and 3 state that the
final cost for a paired execution is a multiple of ε .
Proof. Point 1 immediately follows from the fact that the choice of coupling in τ does not depend
on ε , and that ε does not appear other than in sampling statements. This ensures that all paired
states in Qc and Q1 are the same.
Point 2 Suppose that (s1, s2,d) ∈ Qc . By definition of postτ , shift and null couplings, and our
assumption that all sampling statements are of the form Lapiexpε(−) or Expiexpε (−), then we know
that d is of the form
∑n
i=1 aic , where ai ∈ Z. By Point 1 and the assumption that ε does not affect
the choice of coupling, we know that (s1, s2,∑ni=1 ai ) ∈ Q1.
Point 3 follows analogously. ■
The following theorem immediately follows from the above lemma and Thm. 4.7; it shows that if
we find a winning coupling strategy for ε = 1, then we prove ε-dp.
Theorem B.2. Fix program P and adjacency relation ∆. Suppose that we have a family of synchro-
nizing coupling strategies {τj }j ∈Dvr such that for every trace σ ∈ Σ(P), we have
postτj (∆1 × {0},σ ) ⊆ {(s ′1, s ′2, c) | c ⩽ 1 ∧ s ′1(vr ) = j ⇒ s ′2(vr ) = j},
where ∆1 is as defined in Lem. B.1. Then, P is ε-differentially private.
B.2 Algorithmic details
We now present more details details on the algorithm we used in our implementation for solving
Horn clauses with uninterpreted functions. The functions synth and verify are treated as black-
box external solvers that we assume we have access to. The primary piece we describe here is the
unrolling of clauses C into a non-recursive set Cn , and encoding them for the synthesizer synth.
Unrolling. The unrolling/unwinding process of clauses C to Cn is a standard procedure that
follows, for example, the algorithm of McMillan and Rybalchenko [2013]. We assume there is a
single clause Q ∈ C whose head is not a relation application—we call it the query clause. The
unrolling starts with clause Q , and creates a fresh copy of every clause whose head is a relation
that appears in the body of Q , and so on, recursively, up to depth n. This is analogous to unrolling
program loops n times.
The procedure unroll is shown in algorithm 1. We call it with unroll(C,Q,n), where n > 0.
We use Cn to denote the clause C but with head relation r tagged with number n + 1, i.e., rn+1,
and with body relations tagged with number n. These are new relation symbols resulting from the
unrolling process.
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fun unroll(C,C,n)
if n = 0 then return ∅
let B = {r | r (v) in body of C}
letU = {C | C ∈ C with relation in head is in set B}
let C′ = {Cn} ∪⋃U ∈U unroll(C,U ,n − 1)
return C ′
Algorithm 1. Unrolling procedure
Example B.3. Consider the following clauses:
r (x) −→ x > 0
r (x) ∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r (x ′)
If we unroll these clauses up to n = 3, we get the following:
r 3(x) −→ x > 0
r 2(x) ∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r 3(x ′)
r 1(x) ∧ f (x) = x ′ −→ r 2(x ′)
Notice that the clauses resulting from unrolling are non-recursive. ■
Synthesis. Once we have non-recursive clauses C, we can construct a formula of the form
∃f1, . . . , fn . ∃r1, . . . , rm .
∧
C ∈C
C
where fi and ri are the function and relation symbols appearing in the unrolled clauses.
Since C are non-recursive, we can rewrite them to remove the relation symbols. This is a standard
encoding in Horn clause solving that is analogous to encoding a loop-free program as a formula, as
in VC generation and bounded model checking, and we do not detail it here. We thus transform∧
C ∈C C into a formula of the form ∀x .φ. (Recall that C are universally quantified.)
At this point, we have a problem of the form
∃f1, . . . , fn . ∀x .φ
which can be solved using program synthesis algorithms.
Soundness. The soundness of the algorithm solve, in § 7.1, follows trivially from the soundness
of the verify procedure. In other words, no matter what synth returns, assuming verify is sound,
solve will be sound. This is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem B.4. Let C be a set of Horn clauses with potentially uninterpreted functions. Assume
that, given a set of clauses C′ with no uninterpreted functions, if verify(C′) return sat, then C′ is
satisfiable. Then, if solve(C) returns sat, C are satisfiable.
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